







Bertelsmann  
FOUNDATION



# CROSS-CUTTING CURRENTS



TRANSATLANTIC  
PRIMER  
2022



Bertelsmann  
FOUNDATION

# **CROSS-CUTTING CURRENTS**

**TRANSATLANTIC  
PRIMER  
2022**





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# INTRODUCTION

**T**he U.S. and Europe have an opportunity to engage closely on a broad range of challenges in 2022. To that end, the Bertelsmann Foundation has produced *Cross-Cutting Currents*, a transatlantic primer, as a foundational and introductory resource for those who seek a better understanding of the transatlantic relationship. This publication addresses the most pressing challenges affecting five of the transatlantic community's key actors—the U.S., Germany, France, Italy, and the UK. This bloc of countries faces several domestic and foreign challenges that require multilateral solutions.

*Cross-Cutting Currents* provides an introductory overview of each transatlantic partner's approach to domestic, transatlantic, and global challenges. The publication contains 25 primers covering five distinct policy domains—trade, security, climate, China and technology. Each primer consists of a concise two-page background of the country's past, present, and anticipated future policy positions.

The primer also includes a two-page spread of infographics. The first is a chart that shows where various political parties stand on specific subtopics in each policy field. The chart includes traffic light indicators to display where individual parties stand: green signifies support; red indicates opposition; yellow means mixed views; and grey designates no official position taken. The second infographic provides a snapshot of public opinion on questions pertaining to each policy area. Finally, the reader can find a glossary at the end of the publication of bolded terms found throughout the text and an overview of all featured political parties.

The combination of primers, political party charts, and citizen surveys about each country showcases where there is room for allies to cooperate in 2022.

## METHODOLOGY

**Primers:** Each two-page primer is based on governmental, think tank, and media sources. Think tank and country experts in each policy area completed a peer review evaluation of the content.

**Political Party Charts:** The information in each "traffic light" chart is based on official party and government statements. The inclusion of each political party is based on the results of the last national election or on recent public opinion polling.

**Public Opinion Infographics:** All 25 public opinion infographics include data collected in [Transatlantic Trends 2021](#). Transatlantic Trends is an annual survey publication by the Bertelsmann Foundation in partnership with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The 2021 edition includes the results of surveys conducted in 11 countries representing virtually every region of the transatlantic community. Kantar conducted the polling online over a two-week period in April 2021. The results are weighted for age, gender, and region in all countries, and in certain countries according to education and income.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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We would like to thank Claudio Mendonca and his team for the incredible design of the project, and Lisa Goldman for her expert editing skills.

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**Irene Braam**

Executive Director - Bertelsmann Foundation

**Bertelsmann**  
**FOUNDATION**

The Bertelsmann Foundation (North America), Inc., established in 2008, was created to promote and strengthen the transatlantic relationship. Through research, analysis, forums, and audio and multimedia content, we seek to educate and engage a transatlantic audience on the most pressing economic, political, and social challenges facing the United States and Europe. We are the U.S. arm of the Germany-based Bertelsmann Stiftung.  
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Trade



# TRADE UNITED STATES

## PAST

Over the past 20 years, Democratic and Republican administrations have negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) in virtually every corner of the world. President Bill Clinton concluded **NAFTA**; the George W. Bush administration signed **CAFTA-DR**; President Obama brokered deals with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama; President Donald Trump enacted the **U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)**, replacing NAFTA, and also negotiated deals with Brazil, Ecuador, and Japan.<sup>1</sup> Of these many agreements, several U.S. administrations have attempted without success to create a transatlantic trade agreement with the EU. The **Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)**, initiated by the Obama administration, was largely abandoned by both sides in 2016.<sup>2</sup> In 2011, the Obama administration attempted to negotiate the landmark **Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)** with its pivot toward the Asia-Pacific. U.S. trade relations changed significantly during the Trump administration with its “America first” policy. The administration implemented protectionist policies, abandoned trade agreements like the TPP and NAFTA, and imposed sanctions on foes (China) and friends (the EU) alike.

## PRESENT

President Biden’s trade policy has differed greatly from those of his predecessor’s. The U.S. has halted for now the bitter three-year trade war the Trump administration waged on China. It has sought to continue the **Phase One Agreement**, initiated by the Trump administration, mainly refocusing tariffs that negatively impact Americans and raising concerns over Chinese practices that disrupt competition and limit market access.<sup>3</sup> It has made a point of partnering with allies to rebuild partnerships as a means of reinstating U.S.-led multilateral trade policy.

## Transatlantic Primer

A quick U.S.-EU reproachment in trade policy was always unlikely, but both Washington and Brussels have made significant strides to repair the relationship. In June 2021, the U.S. and the EU reached an agreement pertaining to a 17-year trade dispute over subsidies and tax breaks for the aerospace industry.<sup>4</sup> President Biden said, “I’ve been making the case that the U.S. and Europe—and democracies everywhere—are stronger when we work together to advance our shared values like fair competition and transparency. Today’s announcement demonstrates exactly how that can work in practice.”<sup>5</sup> In November 2021, the U.S. rescinded its highly contentious **232 steel**

**and aluminum tariffs** on the EU. In response, the EU ended its retaliatory tariffs on a multitude of American products, including orange juice, bourbon, and motorcycles. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that the 232 tariffs were “one of the biggest bilateral irritants in the U.S.-EU relationship.”<sup>6</sup> The Biden administration has engaged Brussels on transatlantic trade policy through the novel **Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council (TTC)**. Within the TTC, there are four working groups dedicated to developing an integrated transatlantic economy. The four groups focus on securing supply chains, export controls, investment screening, and global trade challenges.<sup>7</sup>

## FUTURE

The **United States Trade Representative (USTR)** has listed the U.S.’ trade goals for 2022. Of seven goals, it aims to open foreign markets and combat unfair trade; fully enforce U.S. trade laws; monitor compliance with agreements; use all available tools to hold other countries accountable, specifically citing China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang; and develop innovative policies to advance President Biden’s trade agenda, citing climate and sustainability goals.<sup>8</sup> The Biden administration is also focused on promoting sustainability in its trade policy, with the goal of putting the U.S. on track to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve net zero global emissions by or before 2050. It is fostering U.S. innovation and production of climate-related technology and promoting resilient renewable energy supply chains.<sup>9</sup>

The Biden White House has made significant progress in reversing the trade tensions generated by the Trump administration. The rescinding of tariffs on both sides of the Atlantic signals a healthy future for the trade relationship throughout Biden’s first term. The Biden administration’s U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai has also reinforced the U.S. position that it cannot address trade concerns, especially trade relations with China, alone. It places an emphasis on multilateral institutions like the **G7**, **U.S.-EU summit**, the **Quad**, the **OECD**, and the TTC, that accelerate progress and pool collective strength among likeminded allies and partners.<sup>10</sup> It will continue to address China’s coercive and unfair economic trade practices and pursue a values-based trade relationship that holds China accountable for its human rights abuses.








TRADE

## Where do the U.S.' political parties stand?

		
Strengthen transatlantic trade		
Support carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)		
Support a U.S.-UK trade deal		
Uphold high environmental and values-based regulations to trade deals		
Diversify and secure supply chains		
Investment screening		
Support import/export controls		
Investing in entrepreneurship and start-ups		

 Support    Mixed Views    Oppose    No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Americans support closer transatlantic economic cooperation?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support




### Education Levels

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support



### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support



## PAST

With Europe's largest economy in terms of GDP, Germany has been the continent's financial engine for the past two decades. Frankfurt is the financial capital of Europe and the home of the **European Central Bank (ECB)** headquarters. The U.S. was traditionally Germany's largest trade partner, but over the past five years, China has taken that top spot (combined exports and imports). Germany's trade relationship with China has complicated both European and transatlantic cooperation vis-à-vis Beijing.

The previous four Merkel governments made efforts to strengthen economic ties between the U.S. and Europe. The former chancellor helped establish the 2007 **Transatlantic Economic Council** and, during the Obama administration, pushed for the **Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP**, which would have served as the first comprehensive trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU. Under the Trump administration, the U.S.-German trade relationship remained strong but somewhat tense, owing to President Trump's antagonistic rhetoric. This tension manifested in market destabilization stemming from the threat of tariffs on German goods, especially on automotive vehicles manufactured in the U.S.<sup>11</sup> German trade, like that of most globally integrated economies, was hurt by the pandemic, although Germany was able to maintain its trade surplus. The Biden administration lifted Trump-era sanctions in November 2021 and is engaging Europe through the newly created **Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council (TTC)**, thus setting U.S.-German trade relations on a smoother path.

## PRESENT

The new government of Chancellor Olaf Scholz places an emphasis on a trade policy characterized by fair, sustainable, ecological standards. The coalition agreement underlines its commitment to multilateral organizations like the **World Trade Organization (WTO)**, but also pledges to anchor its trade policy in the **Paris Climate Accord** and **United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)**.<sup>12</sup> The government aims to develop an industrial strategy that prevents **carbon leakage**. Accordingly, in line with the European Green Deal, it advocates a European **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism** that must

comply with WTO rules and conforms with the EU **emissions trading system**.<sup>13,14,15</sup>

Germany's new governing parties, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Greens, and Free Democratic Party (FDP), all favor a strong trade relationship with the U.S., which is still one of Germany's most important trade partners and remains the number one destination for German goods and foreign direct investment.<sup>16</sup> The Scholz government promotes European cooperation with the U.S. to pursue trade and investment with high environmental and social standards in order to set global norms.

## FUTURE

Berlin's commitment to a strong transatlantic trade partnership with the U.S. is unlikely to change in 2022, particularly given that the *laissez-faire* Free Democrats, a party that now holds the keys to Germany's powerful finance ministry, are in the coalition. Like most countries across the globe, German imports and exports declined due to the pandemic and supply chain problems. It was able to maintain a trade surplus, but the end of 2021 showed successive months of declining exports, mainly due to supply chain bottlenecks.<sup>17</sup> Working Group Three of the TTC, set to meet again in Spring 2022, is devoted to improving supply chains between the EU and U.S.<sup>18</sup> The November 2021 lifting of the U.S. travel ban will likely help the trade relationship in the new year, pending further lockdown restrictions due to variants. In 2021, approximately 35 percent of German companies in the U.S. either cut or postponed investments due to the travel ban.<sup>19</sup>

Germany's trade relationship with China will remain of utmost importance to the country's economy as it continues to rebuild from the pandemic. But the Greens and the FDP have notably favored taking a tougher approach toward China, signaling the potential for U.S.-German cooperation. In terms of trade, the Greens and FDP oppose the **Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)** between Europe and China. This opposition will likely continue under the new government, which has outlined a values-based approach toward Beijing. Annalena Baerbock, Germany's new Green Party foreign minister, said in 2021 that she would avoid pursuing "a purely economic course" and stand up to human rights violations.<sup>20</sup> However, since Germany's reliance on the Chinese market persists as it rebuilds from the pandemic, the extent to which the new government will back its rhetoric with action remains to be seen.





TRADE

## Where do Germany's political parties stand?

	SPD	CDU CSU	BÜNDNIS 90 DIE GRÜNEN	Freie Demokraten FDP	Alternative für Deutschland	DIE LINKE.
Support the Eurozone	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
Strengthen transatlantic trade	✓	✓	✓	✓ <sup>1</sup>	... <sup>2</sup>	✗
Support carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
Uphold high enviornmental and values-based regulations to trade deals	✓	...	✓	...	✗	✓
Diversify and secure supply chains	✓	✓	✓	—	✓	✓
Investment screening	✓	✓	✓	✓	—	✓
Support import/export controls	✓	—	✓	—	✗	✓
Investing in entrepreneurship and start-ups	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


1- Call for transatlantic trade agreement | 2 - Not explicitly mentioned, but want FTAs

✓ Support    ... Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Germans support closer transatlantic economic cooperation?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Education Levels

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support



### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important







## PAST

France's main trade partners are the EU, the U.S., and China. In 2019, France's GDP ranked seventh in the world; it ranked number five for exports and number six for imports.<sup>21</sup> That same year, trade in goods and services between the U.S. and France came to more than \$138 billion. The U.S. is France's top destination for investment and its largest foreign investor. Under the Trump administration, trade relations were tense. When France imposed a digital services tax on Amazon and Google, the U.S. threatened to retaliate by imposing duties of up to 100 percent on various French products.<sup>22</sup> Another source of tension between former President Trump and President Macron was a 17-year-old trade dispute between Airbus and Boeing; aircraft, helicopters, and spacecraft are among France's top exports. In May 2021, the disagreement between the two aviation giants was resolved, putting an end to the longest trade dispute in the history of the **World Trade Organization (WTO)**. The U.S. and France agreed to stop imposing harmful tariffs and to focus instead on ensuring fair competition while promoting transatlantic cooperation.

## PRESENT

The brief détente was interrupted in September 2021 by the **AUKUS** incident, with Australia canceling a €48 billion contract with France in a move that undermined French strategy in the Indo-Pacific. France responded by recalling its ambassadors in D.C. and Canberra, attempting to slow a trade deal the EU was negotiating with Australia, and trying to delay the first session of the **EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council**. Tensions eased somewhat in October when the Biden administration announced it was lifting the **232 steel and aluminum tariffs** that the Trump administration had imposed. French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire had said that lifting the tariffs would ben-

## Transatlantic Primer

efit the transatlantic relationship, adding that a strong France and Europe should be in America's interest.<sup>23</sup>

President Macron sees trade through a very European lens, seeking a balance between openness and protectionism. EU-level negotiations have been ongoing with Chile, Mexico, **Mercosur**, Australia, and New Zealand, while Canada and Japan have already entered into agreements. This is part of a broader EU strategy to negotiate


## FUTURE

President Macron has championed pro-open market policies, so long as those who agree to play, play fairly. He has pushed for a more defensive Europe that protects domestic strengths against competition from China and the U.S. and will continue to do so. With France assuming the **EU Council presidency** this year, he will have an opportunity to shape its agenda in ongoing trade negotiations. Critics say that Macron's vetoes would be a veiled defense of French interests, but MEP Marie-Pierre Vedrenne defended the French president, saying: "The line during the French presidency is about the end of a naïve Europe." Another of Macron's priorities during his EU presidency is to protect European farmers and keep them competitive by restricting food imports from countries that have weaker labor and environmental standards.<sup>26</sup>

"new generation" trade agreements with broader scopes of application.<sup>24</sup> European deals are the driving factor in France's current approach to global trade—with the stipulation that trade partners must reciprocate. France seeks to challenge Europe's trade partners on labor and environmental standards; for example, President Macron vetoed an EU deal with Mercosur on the grounds that they were not doing enough to prevent deforestation in the region.<sup>25</sup>

Marine Le Pen, presidential candidate of the far-right National Rally, aims mainly to mitigate the effects of globalization on French domestic interests. She has often criticized French politicians for sacrificing France to globalization. She campaigned in 2017 on a "Frexit" from the European Union, but her current platform is less extreme, calling instead for certain reforms to the EU. Her concept of Europe is less of a supranational one and more of a "Europe of Nations," where France could pursue its national interests freely. République's presidential candidate Valerie Pécresse places France's interests first but believes the European Union to be an important vehicle to push forward French ambitions. One of her priorities with regard to trade and sustainability is to ensure an effective EU carbon border adjustment mechanism is developed. Implementing the **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)** will have lasting impacts on the way trade occurs both inside and outside of European borders.





TRADE

## Where do France's political parties stand?

	LA RÉPUBLIQUE En Marche !	les IR Républicains	Rassemblement National	R! RECONQUÊTE	PS SOCIAL ÉCOLOGIE	La France Insoumise
Support the Eurozone	✓	✓	... <sub>1</sub>	—	✓	✓
Strengthen transatlantic trade	... <sub>2</sub>	—	—	—	—	✗
Support carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)	✓	✓	... <sub>3</sub>	—	✓	—
Uphold high enviornmental and values-based regulations to trade deals	✓	✓	—	—	✓	—
Diversify and secure supply chains	✓	✓	✓	—	—	—
Investment screening	✓	✓	—	—	—	✓
Support import/export controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Investing in entrepreneurship and start-ups	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	—


1 - Party called for withdrawal from euro in 2017, but now says withdrawing has negative consequences | 2 - Trade deal dependent on U.S. commitment to consider climate and inequality issues | 3 - Party supports an ecological customs barrier similar to CBAM

✓ Support    ... Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

## Transatlantic Primer


## Do the French support closer transatlantic economic cooperation?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support




### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



## PAST

Italy is the world's eighth largest economy and the third largest in the **Eurozone** with a GDP of \$1.85 trillion as of 2020.<sup>27</sup> SMEs, many of which are family-owned, comprise 95 percent of Italian businesses and produce 67 percent of Italy's GDP.<sup>28</sup> Italy also succeeds in the arms and defense sectors—especially with Leonardo, which is a major element of European and transatlantic joint ventures. Historically the U.S. has been one of Italy's most important trade partners, with bilateral trade valued at nearly \$105 billion in 2019.<sup>29</sup> In 2020, Italy was the 16th largest market for U.S. exports and the fifth largest U.S. export market in the EU. The U.S. remained by far Italy's largest non-EU export market with roughly a 9 percent share of all non-EU exports. U.S.-Italian trade volumes have increased notably over the last 10 years, nearly doubling since 2009.<sup>30</sup> American exports to Italy are concentrated in elite sectors including chemicals, oil and gas, transportation equipment, metals, and electronics. Germany is Italy's primary export destination (12.5 percent), France ranks second (10.3 percent), while the U.S. ranks third (9.9 percent) and China tenth.<sup>31</sup> Italy's involvement in **Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)** under the administration of former PM Giuseppe Conte made Italy's Atlantic commercial partners wary of its foreign policy priorities; but, according to experts, the current government has put Italy in "enviable shape."<sup>32</sup>

## PRESENT

The **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)** reported in its latest economic outlook that Italy's GDP is projected to rise 6.3 percent in the next year, adding: "the strong 2021 rebound from COVID-19 is forecast to ease progressively in 2022 and 2023."<sup>33</sup> Made in Italy products garnered €500 billion in the period between September 2020 and August 2021 and that number is expected to rise. Italy in fact surpassed pre-pandemic levels of trade in June 2021, already augmented by 6 percent compared to the same eight-month period in 2019.<sup>34</sup>

Thanks to his outstanding reputation as former **European Central Bank (ECB)** President, Prime Minister Mario Draghi has restored global faith in Italy's future. Draghi's legislation aims to boost competition in key sectors, a cornerstone of Draghi's plan to streamline bureaucracy. The Competition Decree seeks to reorganize various sectors with new regulations: "We are starting a project of transparency," Draghi said during a cabinet meeting. He confirmed that "Today's measures fulfill all the commitments we have made," and that Italy's budget is fundamentally expansive. "Growth is the way out of the problem of high public debt."<sup>35</sup> Italy is therefore playing a defining role in the use of the **EU recovery fund**, whose success or failure will likely shape European integration. Italy's **G20** Presidency also elevated its status and global credibility, both through its diplomatic and economic leadership.

## FUTURE

Italian entrepreneurs aim to drill from within Italy's delimitations of the Adriatic Sea, which could reduce all surcharges on gas due to international levies.<sup>37</sup> Italy pays 70 cents per cubic meter of gas (m<sup>3</sup>); should Italy produce its own, the cost would equal about 5 cents per m<sup>3</sup>.<sup>38</sup> If pursued within Italian borders in 2022, this could result in a shakeup in Mediterranean trade, as Italy currently obtains most of its oil and gas from Libya and Azerbaijan, ranking third in Azeri exports of natural gas.

Italy's Draghi administration has taken a staunchly Atlanticist foreign policy—as opposed to his predecessor, who leaned more pro-China. Italy is poised to position itself closer to French and German leadership, especially with Draghi's goal to help construct a multilateral and equal transatlantic system. In November 2021, Italy and France signed a historical bilateral treaty. Under

As the EU country that was hit hardest by the pandemic in mid-2021, Italy was granted the lion's share of the EU Recovery Fund—nearly €200 billion. Italy's recovery is expected to benefit from its government's supportive fiscal policy, investment, and its return to providing pre-pandemic services, which are outlined in its comprehensive National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR).<sup>36</sup> The plan includes several reforms, including bureaucratic and infrastructural. PNRR also reaffirms Italy's commitments to the **Paris Climate Accord** and **UN Sustainable Development Goals**. Presently, Europe is experiencing a crisis due to rising energy costs. Natural gas such as methane, an alternative to coal, is considered the bridge solution pending structural development of renewable sources as it enthusiastically fulfills its **2023 EU Climate Goals** obligation to pursue greener energy.

the Conte administration, China was between eighth and tenth place as the principal destination of Italian exports and ranked third in imports into Italy. It is now possible to envision a change to those rankings, despite Draghi's recognition of the need for commercial ties with Chinese businesses. A change in the political landscape might occur in early 2022 as President Sergio Mattarella announced that he has decided he will not seek reelection, which means that a new president will be appointed by Parliament in February. There has been speculation that Draghi himself will step down as prime minister and instead lead as president, which could result in popular elections to choose his replacement. Both scenarios would produce some instability, at least for a few months. While these hypotheticals are thus far unsubstantiated, the fact that Draghi will have an apical role in any case nevertheless provides confidence in the future of Italian commercial relations.





TRADE

# Where do Italy's political parties stand?

					
Support the Eurozone	⋯ <sub>1</sub>	✓	⋯ <sub>1</sub>	✓	⋯ <sub>2</sub>
Strengthen transatlantic trade	—	✓	—	—	—
Support carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)	✓	✓	—	✓	—
Uphold high environmental and values-based regulations to trade deals	✓	✓	—	—	✓
Diversify and secure supply chains	—	—	✓	✓	✓
Investment screening	—	✓	✓	—	—
Support import/export controls	—	✓	✓	✓	✓
Investing in entrepreneurship and start-ups	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


1- Party leaders questioned the Euro in 2018 | 2- Party calls for reform of euro and ECB

✓ Support    ⋯ Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Italians support closer transatlantic cooperation?

### Overall Perceptions




### Education

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support



### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support



### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



## PAST

The UK has signed trade deals with 69 countries since leaving the EU in January 2020, with most of them copying the terms of pre-**Brexit** agreements.<sup>39</sup> The government was under pressure to sign post-Brexit agreements before the end of 2020, when trade would have fallen under **World Trade Organization (WTO)** terms that subject imports to high tariffs and documentation.<sup>40</sup>

When the UK was still an EU member state, it was Europe's strongest advocate for the **Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)** between the U.S. and the EU.<sup>41</sup> The Brexit campaign asserted that the UK could thus broker its own trade agreements with the U.S. In 2018, the Office of the **U.S. Trade Representative** notified Congress of its intent to enter trade negotiations with the UK, with official talks having launched on May 5, 2020. A U.S.-UK trade and investment working group has signed several agreements on specific products, but has yet to reach a full agreement.<sup>42</sup>

## PRESENT

The UK's main exports are machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, and miscellaneous manufacturers—an all-encompassing term for manufactured items in multiple industries. Its largest trade partner is the EU. Its top destinations for exports are the U.S., Germany, and Ireland, while most of its imported goods come from the U.S., Germany, and China.<sup>43</sup> Like most countries, the UK is rebuilding from the COVID-19 pandemic, which hurt both imports and exports.

The UK is also in the process of securing more trade deals. In October 2020, it signed an agreement with Japan, the first that differed from an existing EU trade deal.<sup>44</sup> In January 2021, after years of negotiations, the UK also entered a new trade deal with the EU. The trade relationship is very different from

## Transatlantic Primer

when the UK was a member of the European single market, with the door now open for tariffs and export restrictions based on EU laws.<sup>45</sup> In June 2021, the UK and Australia announced a new trade deal, the first the UK had negotiated from scratch since leaving the EU.<sup>46</sup> While the U.S. and UK enjoy a strong relationship in many policy domains, trade included, the prospects for a full UK-U.S. trade deal are currently muted. Both U.S. President Biden and UK Prime Minister Johnson, during a meeting in September 2021, recognized that the chances of securing an agreement before the next U.S. general election are unlikely. Biden and many European leaders stipulate that trade rests upon full compliance with the agreements adopted under the **Northern Ireland Protocol**.<sup>47</sup> The agreement helps prevent checks at the Irish border, which sparked violence during the Troubles.<sup>48</sup>

## FUTURE

The UK will likely join the CPTPP in 2022.<sup>51</sup> Its role within the bloc, as well as ASEAN, strengthens the country's position in the greater Indo-Pacific, offering the chance to engage more closely with regional partners and benefit from the region's booming economic growth. The UK's deal with Australia is also likely to come into effect this year. It aims to phase out quotas and tariffs on certain goods (mainly agricultural) over a 15-year period.<sup>52</sup>

In November 2021, the Export Finance office announced a 12-point plan to increase the country's annual exports to £1 billion by 2030.<sup>53</sup> But the UK will continue to grapple with the implications of Brexit on its trade, with billions of pounds of goods now subject to EU tariffs. The **Office for Budget**

Aside from bilateral trade agreements, the UK has floated the idea of joining the North American trade agreement (**USMCA**) between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico via docking clause. But while experts suggest the UK could benefit on certain goods and digital trade, the potential for economic growth is minimal.<sup>49</sup>

The UK has also begun tilting its focus toward the Indo-Pacific region, a policy put forward in the March 2021 **Integrated Review**.

In February 2021, the UK applied to become a member of the **Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)**; if accepted, it will become the bloc's sole European member. In August 2021, the UK successfully joined the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)** as a dialogue partner, a status that gives it a seat at one of the region's most influential organizations.<sup>50</sup>



**Responsibility** has estimated that UK exports to the EU will be about 15 percent lower under the current UK-EU free trade agreement.<sup>54</sup> In response to the plan, trade experts have pointed out the need to find more pragmatic ways to engage the EU, still the UK's largest trade partner, on reducing or eliminating current barriers.





TRADE

## Where do the UK's political parties stand?

				
Support deepening economic ties with the EU	...	✓	✓	✓
Supported Brexit	✓	✗	✗	✗
Avoid hard border in Northern Ireland	—	✓	✓	—
Strengthen transatlantic trade	✓	... <sub>1</sub>	... <sub>1</sub>	—
Support carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Uphold high environmental and values-based regulations to trade deals	—	✓	✓	✓
Diversify and secure supply chains	✓	✓	✓	✓
Investment screening	✓	✓	✓	✓
Investing in entrepreneurship and start-ups	✓	✓	✓	✓


1- The party did not support a U.S.-UK FTA under the Trump administration over fears of decreasing environmental and health standards and inability to export to the EU

✓ Support    ... Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Britons support closer transatlantic cooperation?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support




### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important







Security



## PAST

The U.S. has long possessed one of the largest militaries in the world and thus plays a leading role in the transatlantic community's foremost military alliance, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**. The size and capability of the U.S. military has given Washington outsized power within the bloc, but also allowed it, at times, to pursue its own interests. In the last 20 years the U.S. has embarked on several military interventions in the Middle East, at times to the detriment of transatlantic unity. Following 9/11, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, along with many other European partners, a mission ultimately subsumed by NATO's **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)** and later **Operation Resolute Support**. Following **United Nations (UN)** disapproval of the 2003 Iraq invasion, the U.S.' decision to proceed with its "**coalition of the willing**," to which the UK and Italy belonged,<sup>55</sup> sparked a backlash from several European partners, most notably France and Germany.<sup>56</sup>

Europe's role in U.S. foreign policy has subsequently diminished in parallel with China's global rise. During the Obama years, the U.S. shifted its focus toward the Indo-Pacific theater, a trend that remains relevant in current transatlantic discussions. NATO was a target of the Trump administration, which questioned its relevance and lambasted European members for their perceived inadequate contributions to the alliance. While the assessment mirrored that of previous administrations, the vitriolic nature of the messaging hurt transatlantic ties. Still, despite the U.S.' pivot away from Europe toward the Indo-Pacific, Russia's actions in the European neighborhood have resulted in the U.S. maintaining a strong military presence on the continent.

## PRESENT

U.S. President Biden has reaffirmed Washington's commitment to NATO and **Article 5**. Europe remains very important to the U.S. for its geostrategic position

## Transatlantic Primer

and American power projection. Stuttgart is home to both the U.S. Europe and Africa commands. It is also home to the most U.S. soldiers in Europe, hosting nearly 34,000, followed by Italy with approximately 12,000, and the UK with 9,000. The U.S. currently heads NATO forces in Poland as part of Operation Enhanced Forward Presence to deter Russian aggression against the bloc's eastern partners. U.S. involvement in eastern Europe has increased over the years as a result of Moscow's actions in the region, especially along the Ukrainian border.

However, despite President Biden's commitment to the transatlantic community, the administration is still rebounding from 2021 security policy disputes. In August, the U.S. ended its 20-year war in Afghanistan. While the withdrawal enjoyed transatlantic approval, Washington's execution sparked backlash both domestically and abroad. Despite

## FUTURE

In 2022 the Biden administration will continue to rebuild confidence with its European partners. The U.S. and Europe will continue to cooperate on the community's top security threats—Russia, China, and Iran. In November and December 2021, the U.S. made a point of responding to Russia's actions in eastern Europe. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Latvia, delivering joint statements with Europeans about the transatlantic community's support for NATO's eastern members and Ukraine.<sup>61</sup> In December 2021, President Biden held two separate talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin warning him of Washington's and Europe's willingness to "respond with strong economic and other measures" pending further actions in Ukraine.<sup>62, 63</sup> More formal talks between the U.S. and Russia started in Geneva in the new year.<sup>64</sup> The U.S. has also approved \$200 million of defensive aid to Kyiv and has placed troops on high alert to deter further threats from Moscow. Europe's eastern flank will likely be a point of interest throughout 2022, pending further Russian aggression against Ukraine.

calls from European allies to delay the withdrawal, the Biden administration pressed on, hurting diplomatic ties and undermining perceptions of U.S. reliability.<sup>57, 58</sup> In September 2021, the U.S. joined the three-party **AUKUS** with the UK and Australia.<sup>59</sup> As part of the agreement, the U.S. is supplying Canberra with nuclear submarines. The move, while consistent with Washington's bipartisan shift eastward, came at the detriment of Franco-American relations. France, which had a similar deal with Australians, was not consulted; President Macron responded with the unprecedented action of recalling France's ambassador to Washington.<sup>60</sup> The nature of the Afghanistan withdrawal, coupled with the subsequent AUKUS spat, seems to indicate that the U.S., regardless of who is president, will pursue its own interests, even at the cost of undermining trust with European partners.

Despite AUKUS, Washington and Brussels have continued to hold talks on Beijing through the U.S.-EU Dialogue on China. Both have voiced strong concern over China's territorial expansion in the South China Sea. As China expands its nuclear capabilities, ventures further away from the Indo-Pacific, establishes military bases in Africa and infrastructure projects in Europe, and engages in military exercises with Russia, U.S. and European interests are converging. In October 2021, NATO labeled China a "global security challenge."<sup>65</sup>

In 2021, the U.S. also made efforts to restore the **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)** with Iran, from which the Trump administration withdrew in 2018.<sup>66</sup> In October 2021, President Biden said that the U.S. will rejoin the agreement if Iran abides by the terms of the deal. But December 2021 talks between European and U.S. diplomats in Vienna fell flat, making the prospects of a full U.S. return to the agreement in 2022 uncertain.

























SECURITY

## Where do the U.S.' political parties stand?

		
Support NATO 2% spending target		
Support U.S. involvement in European security and defense		
Increase defense spending		
Nuclear defense and sharing		
Support for non-proliferation		
Support a nuclear deal with Iran		
Support Nord Stream 2		
Sanctions against human rights abusers		

 Support

 Mixed Views


 Oppose

 No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Americans find NATO important to the security of their country?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important





## PAST

Germany has long been a key member of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**. However, despite the importance of Germany to the alliance, German history has complicated the relationship between its society and the military. With the end of the Cold War and reunification, Germany quickly assumed a leading role in Europe. This has created a two-pronged dilemma: on the one hand, German domestic skepticism regarding the size of the military and its use persists; on the other, the international community is calling for increased military and security action from Germany in many affairs. In 1999, Germany's participation in NATO's Kosovo intervention marked the first time German troops had engaged in combat in the post-war era—much to the dismay of large segments of German society. Since then, Germany has received criticism from past U.S. administrations, both Republican and Democratic, for its reluctance to improve its military capabilities and assume a more active role in NATO missions. This dilemma is a key issue underlying discussions related to Germany's role in transatlantic security affairs.

## PRESENT

The parties comprising Germany's new coalition government, the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and Free Democrats (FDP), all support a strong military relationship with the U.S. under the umbrella of NATO, saying the transatlantic relationship is a "central pillar" and the alliance an "indispensable" part of the country's security.<sup>67</sup> However, the new government of Chancellor Olaf Scholz is taking a slightly different approach to security and defense matters. The outgoing Christian Democrats (CDU) had planned to increase military spending and troop deployments, while the Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens currently wish to decrease defense spending altogether. Furthermore, while leaders of the FDP openly support the NATO two percent defense spending target, the SPD and Greens have failed to

## Transatlantic Primer

endorse the policy.<sup>68</sup> The SPD and Greens go further by questioning NATO nuclear sharing (not a new position for the Germans) and openly support the **Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)**.<sup>69</sup>

Germany's military is currently the fifth largest in NATO. Foreign deployments range from supporting NATO forces in Kosovo and engaging the **Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)** to helping European military missions on the Horn of Africa and in the Mediterranean. Small numbers of troops are also deployed in Mali, South Sudan, Lebanon, and the Western Sahara.<sup>70</sup> Germany is additionally

## FUTURE

In 2022, the new German government's approach to security issues is likely to resemble that of Merkel's government. It will remain a key actor within NATO, although military capabilities and the political will to use them will remain hampered by the same domestic constraints. Like many European states, the Afghanistan withdrawal and establishment of the **AUKUS** alliance reinforced beliefs among segments of Germany's political establishment that the country should take further steps in the future to decouple itself from U.S. security. While committed to NATO, the **traffic light** parties all push for greater European military cooperation moving forward.<sup>74</sup> Calls for European "**strategic autonomy**," however, are not as loud in Germany as they are in neighboring France.

Many eyes are on the new government's nuclear policy in 2022. The Scholz government wants Germany to take a "leading role" in strengthening international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. It supports the **Global Zero** movement and wants Germany to be "free from nuclear weapons," complicating nuclear sharing (the U.S. currently has 20 nuclear weapons in Germany). Germany will attend the March 2022 TPNW summit in Vienna. While it will reportedly not sign the agreement, the country's attendance shows that NATO's nuclear allies, the U.S., the

leading NATO forces in Lithuania (since 2014) as part of NATO's **Enhanced Forward Presence** mission in Poland and the Baltic states. The mission seeks to strengthen the bloc's central and eastern neighbors in opposition to growing Russian threats.<sup>71</sup> While the SPD supports a new **Ostpolitik** with Russia, a policy popularized under leaders of the party during the Cold War, the Greens and FDP prefer a tougher stance.<sup>72</sup> Relatedly, while the SPD has been a staunch supporter of the **Nord Stream 2 pipeline (NS2)**, the FDP and Greens oppose it, citing European security and legal concerns.<sup>73</sup>

UK, and France, are worried.<sup>75</sup> The new government also supports global initiatives like the **Joint Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (JCPOA)** and calls for the U.S. to return to the negotiating table.

It is unclear how the Scholz government will engage with the U.S. on security matters, particularly those related to Russia and China. Some fear Germany's reliance on Russian energy and the Chinese market could complicate its ability to take a tougher stance toward the two powers. The coalition agreement among the parties, however, does include language on Germany's commitment to strengthening central and eastern European partners.<sup>76</sup> German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in January 2022, condemning Russia's actions and underlining solidarity with eastern Europe.<sup>77</sup> She also traveled to Russia and Ukraine in mid-January to engage officials from both countries on the matter. Shortly thereafter, however, Germany made headlines for blocking NATO ally, Estonia, from shipping German-origin weapons to Ukraine, sparking backlash from transatlantic allies. Further Russian aggression against Ukraine will likely continue to challenge the new German government's foreign and security policy in 2022.





## SECURITY

# Where do Germany's political parties stand?

	SPD	CDU CSU	BÜNDNIS 90 DIE GRÜNEN	Freie Demokraten FDP	Alternative in Deutschland	DIE LINKE.
Support European military cooperation and integration	✓	✓	✓	✓	—	✗
Support NATO 2% spending target	...	✓	✗	✓	...	✗
Support U.S. involvement in European security and defense	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
Increase defense spending	—	✓	—	✓	✓	✗
Nuclear defense and sharing	...	✓	...	...	✗	✗
Support for non-proliferation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support a nuclear deal with Iran	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support Nord Stream 2	— <sup>1</sup>	—	✗	✗	✓	—
Sanctions against human rights abusers	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	—

1- Chancellor Scholz threatened NS2 pipeline due to Russian actions in Ukraine in December 2021

✓ Support    ... Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

## Transatlantic Primer


# Do Germans find NATO important to the security of their country?

## Overall Perceptions




## Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




## Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



## Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



## Geography

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important







## PAST

France was one of the founding members of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** and Paris was the alliance's first permanent headquarters. But in 1966 former President De Gaulle withdrew France from the **NATO Integrated Military Command Structure**, insisting the organization put France on equal footing with the UK and the U.S. While removed from the Integrated Military Command, France nevertheless remained one of the largest contributors to NATO operations throughout the 1990s and 2000s.<sup>78</sup> In 2009, France rejoined the Integrated Military Command and has been an active member since. As one of the few countries that hold nuclear weapons, it has important leverage in advocating for a more European-centric defense, parting from the U.S. security umbrella that was established after World War II.

## PRESENT

Today, France holds about 290 nuclear weapons in its arsenal and employs a "final warning" nuclear strike policy.<sup>79</sup> In a February 2020 speech on the country's nuclear deterrence, President Macron re-introduced the notion that France could offer its nuclear umbrella to willing European partners, placing French nuclear deterrence at the heart of European security.<sup>80</sup> His German counterparts disapproved, believing this would undermine NATO and the U.S.' commitment to Europe. Pushing nuclear as a means of providing European independence is an element in Macron's advocacy of **strategic autonomy**. In a famous interview with *The Economist*, Macron said we were experiencing the "brain death of NATO."<sup>81</sup> Believing that Europe must learn to defend its own neighborhood, France has pursued initiatives like the **European Defense Fund** and a comprehensive **Strategic Compass**. With Brexit, France became the only nuclear power and largest military in the EU.

France has the third largest national defense industry in the world. With industry giants like Dassault and the multinational company Thales, French economic and defense interests exert a strong influence. European critics say that France's push for increased European armament is an expression of self-interest, as it will put the French defense industry on par with that of the U.S.

In September 2020, the French Air Force rebranded itself as the French Air and Space Force, embarking on a new strategic vision and expanding its existing capabilities. France's official space strategy emphasizes continued cooperation with the U.S., viewing them as an "essential ally" in this field.<sup>82</sup> In July 2021, France responded positively to the Pentagon's request for increased transatlantic cooperation with their Space Force in order to counter threats from Russia and China.

## FUTURE

France's military is currently deployed in several operations, including **Operation Barkhane** in the Sahel. Terrorism is described as a central threat to France in the **2021 Defense and National Security Strategic Review**,<sup>83</sup> nevertheless, in an election-year move to quell domestic criticism at what some call "France's Afghanistan,"<sup>84</sup> President Macron announced in July 2021 that the country would pull its counterterrorism force out of the Sahel by the end of Q2 2022.<sup>85</sup> While terrorism remains a priority for his administration, Macron will focus on increasing security at home, proposing bills that extend police powers, and increasing the budgets of domestic security forces.<sup>86</sup> He will continue to push for developing European defense, using Biden's withdrawal of Afghanistan and **AUKUS** as an impetus for increased coordination between EU member states to be competitive defense partners.

National Rally Leader Marine Le Pen's views on defense are inward-looking. She is openly critical of NATO, advocating instead that France pursue closer relations with Russia and depart from what she calls the American agenda. Le Pen's support has grown as the electorate views her anti-immigration policies as a protection against domestic terrorism.<sup>87</sup> Valerie Pécresse, presidential candidate of Les Républicains has stated the defense budget is non-negotiable for a stronger France. She pushes for stronger cybersecurity and strategic intelligence gathering as priorities for future investment. She advocates for European sovereignty in defense matters, built as a pillar complementary to the NATO alliance. Eric Zemmour, leader of the far-right Reconquête, has repeatedly questioned the usefulness of NATO and said he would remove France from the organization's integrated military command.





## SECURITY

# Where do France's political parties stand?

	LA RÉPUBLIQUE En Marche !	les Républicains	Rassemblement National	R! SECURITE	PS SOCIAL ÉCOLOGIE	La France insoumise
Support European military cooperation and integration	✓	✓	✓	—	✓	✗
Support NATO 2% spending target	✓	✓	✗ <sub>1</sub>	✗ <sub>2</sub>	—	✗
Support U.S. involvement in European security and defense	... <sub>3</sub>	✓	✗	✗	... <sub>4</sub>	✗
Increase defense spending	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
Nuclear defense and sharing	✓	✓	✓	✓	... <sub>5</sub>	✗
Support for non-proliferation	✓	—	✓	—	✓	✓
Support a nuclear deal with Iran	✓	—	✗	—	—	—
Support Nord Stream 2	... <sub>6</sub>	—	—	—	—	—
Sanctions against human rights abusers	✓	—	✗	—	✓	—


1- Party supports defense spending, but opposes NATO | 2- Party supports defense spending, but opposes NATO | 3- Supports U.S. partnership, but favors European strategic autonomy | 4- Supports U.S. security relationship, but says U.S. not responsible for European security | 5- No official position, but current Socialist presidential candidate has previously voiced support for a ban on nuclear weapons | 6- President Macron has previously expressed opposition

✓ Support    ... Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

## Transatlantic Primer


# Do the French find NATO important to the security of their country?

## Overall Perceptions




## Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



## Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




## Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



## Geography

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes





## PAST

Italy's geographical position in the southern flank of Europe, only 560 miles from Africa, makes it a key member of **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**—especially in monitoring security concerns in North Africa. North Africa represents an ongoing security interest, but Italy has been historically absent from the Sahel; Matteo Renzi's 2014 visit was the first by an Italian Prime Minister since 1985. Since then, Italy has slowly been turning its security focus toward sub-Saharan Africa in an effort to stop terrorism and limit migration.

A significant focus of Italy's security policy over the past decade has been on managing the influx of refugees arriving in the south of Italy, which in 2014 reached a peak of 170,100.<sup>88</sup> A February 2017 **Memorandum of Understanding with Libya** recruited Libyan naval forces to intercept migrant boats, which lowered the number of arrivals by around 80 percent.<sup>89</sup> This policy was endorsed by each EU member state at the conclusion of its July 2017 **Foreign Affairs Council** summit.

## PRESENT

Italy has always been fully committed to strengthening the NATO partnership, providing financial and human support to the organization's main operations and missions. Its active presence in the Euro-Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Middle East make Italy a crucial element in ensuring the stability of NATO's borders. The Joint Force Command Naples demonstrates Italy's critical role in the Mediterranean, where it provides a hub at Europe's southern border, monitoring and gathering strategic information for counter-piracy and counterterrorism.

As of 2019, Italy spends 1.22 percent of its GDP on defense, the seventh lowest of the NATO countries. But Stefano Stefanini, an Italian former ambassador to NATO, argued that "in providing security, deployability

and operations matter more than budgets."<sup>90</sup> Italian troops have served on NATO and **United Nations (UN)** missions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East to combat crises that lead to mass migrations. According to an official in the Italian Ministry of Defense, "Today's situation is more complicated than war or peace... We're stabilizing an entire region." In 2016, international missions cost the Italian government more than €1 billion beyond the budget for the navy, coast guard, and Guardia di Finanza (Italy's financial crime police) search and rescue missions.<sup>91</sup>

In conjunction with its streamlined border protection operations, specific national counterterror-

## FUTURE

Since the Renzi administration, Italy's security policy toward Africa has been expanding, with a focus on migration issues and the stabilization of the Sahel. In 2015, the Italian Ministry of Defense published a White Paper for International Security and Defense, which showed correlation between the Sahel's limited economic development, poverty, and ethnic conflicts and instability in the Mediterranean.<sup>94</sup> The 2015 **Euro-African Summit** in Valletta tackled illegal migrations, human trafficking, and easing the repatriation processes through the enhancement of political cooperation with African partners, strengthening their capacity to control borders and mobility. Today, Italy's coast guard and navy conduct migrant rescue missions that take its vessels far beyond waters normally considered coast guard territory. The current minister of defense, Lorenzo Guerini, clarified the growing military involvement south of the Sahara: "Italian military engagement in the Sahel fully complements Italy's commitment in Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea."<sup>95</sup>

ism legislation in Italy is extensive. According to a study conducted by the Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), Italy has demonstrated success in counterterrorism legislation and operations.<sup>92</sup> According to EU analysis, prevention and detection of terrorists and terrorist operations at European shores is "at the heart of external border management in Italy, and paramount for a peaceful and secure Europe."<sup>93</sup> Ahead of the 2020 **G20**, Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio confirmed Rome's commitment to counterterrorism by pledging to reinforce its diplomatic presence in Africa and by encouraging cooperation through the **Counter ISIS Finance Group**.

In October 2021, Prime Minister Draghi called for a substantial increase to the defense budget. Draghi also intends to offer leadership within NATO to overcome what has been perceived as European marginality in the organization, especially regarding recent global efforts at mitigating Russian aggression toward Europe. Draghi's unique goal marks a possible turning point in Italy's security and defense policies. Defense Minister Guerini's plan for military spending, or "the overall revitalization of the national defense industry, through the modernization of the military instrument," represents a key objective of Draghi's security policy.<sup>96</sup> The Multiannual Planning Document for 2021-23, a framework detailing anticipated expenditures for the Italian military, allocates considerable resources to a wide range of weapons programs. In fact, the budget outlines an unprecedented increase in investment by nearly 40 percent as compared to 2020.<sup>97</sup> Italy is committed to learning from past mistakes and plans to charter a more streamlined future as a key player and partner for international security.





SECURITY

## Where do Italy's political parties stand?

					
Support European military cooperation and integration	⊖	✓ <sub>1</sub>	✓	⊖	✓
Support NATO 2% spending target	⊖	✓	⊖	⊖	✓
Support U.S. involvement in European security and defense	✓	✓	✓	⊖	✓
Increase defense spending	⊖	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nuclear defense and sharing	✗	⊖	⊖	⊖	✓
Support for non-proliferation	✓	✓	⊖	⊖	⊖
Support a nuclear deal with Iran	✓	✓	⊖	⊖	⊖
Support Nord Stream 2	⊖ <sub>2</sub>	✗ <sub>3</sub>	⊖	⋯ <sub>4</sub>	⊖ <sub>5</sub>
Sanctions against human rights abusers	⊖	⊖	⊖	⊖	⊖


1- Former PD PM Paolo Gentiloni vowed to meet this target. | 2- Party supports lifting Russian sanctions, relaxing European relations with Russia, but also opposed a trans-Adriatic pipeline over environmental concerns | 3- Former PM Paolo Gentiloni opposed NS2 | 4- Party condemns "European dependence on Russian gas" | 5- Party supports lifting Russian sanctions, relaxing European relations with Russia

✓ Support    ⋯ Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    ⊖ No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Italians find NATO important to the security of their country?

### Overall Perceptions




### Education

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support




### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important





## PAST

A founding member of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**, the UK has, along with France, traditionally been one of the alliance's two strongest European military powers. It is also, together with the U.S. and France, one of just three nuclear-armed alliance members. The UK has long enjoyed a particularly strong security relationship with the U.S., contributing troops to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and the **Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (D-ISIS)**.

Since leaving the EU, the UK has largely avoided institutional cooperation with the bloc, focusing more on NATO or pursuing its own partnerships with individual countries. Still, as former Cabinet Secretary Mark Sedwell said in 2019, while the U.S. continues to pivot away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific, "the UK [remains] Europe's biggest security and defense contributor and the U.S.' principal ally."<sup>98</sup> Since **Brexit**, the UK has continued to provide security support in the form of intelligence collection, analysis and sharing, counterterrorism capabilities, and traditional military operations.<sup>99</sup>

## PRESENT

The UK is one of Europe's most capable military powers<sup>100</sup> and one of the strongest in the world. As of 2021, it spends above the 2 percent NATO spending target, contributing 2.2 percent of its annual GDP to defense.<sup>101</sup> The UK currently has troops deployed in the Baltics, Belize, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus, Germany, Gibraltar, Iraq, and the Falklands; it also supports UN missions in South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali.<sup>102</sup>

As of September 2021, the UK is a member of the Australia-initiated **AUKUS** alliance, focused on strengthening Australian security and defense in the Indo-Pacific and countering Chinese influence

## Transatlantic Primer

in the region. Its membership in the alliance, which is closely tied to the UK's **Global Britain** strategy, has damaged its relationship with France, although UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and French President Emmanuel Macron have since spoken on the phone about the importance of cross-channel cooperation.<sup>103</sup>

In March 2021, the government released its Integrated Review, or *Global Britain in a Competitive Age*.<sup>104</sup> The report details the UK's security, defense, development, and foreign policy objectives through 2030, detailing its desire to engage closely with the U.S. It garnered attention for its emphasis on the UK's intention to tilt toward China and the Indo-Pacific region.

Russia's role in the Poland-Belarus border crisis and in Ukraine makes the UK's role in Europe's collective security increasingly important, as the Integrated Review identifies Russia as "the most acute threat to [the UK's] security."<sup>105</sup> The UK has assumed a leading role in eastern Europe through

NATO's **Enhanced Forward Presence**,<sup>106</sup> with troops stationed throughout the Baltic states and Poland. In November 2021, it brokered a multi-billion-pound contract to build a ground-based air defense system in the region.<sup>107</sup> As part of the mission, the UK is leading the NATO battlegroup in Estonia.

In response to Russia's military build-up along NATO's border in late 2021, Johnson said the Polish-Belarusian border situation was "concerning" and that the UK would stand behind Ukraine "in the face of Russian hostility."<sup>108</sup> The Johnson government, along with the Biden administration, has said it would use "all diplomatic and economic levers at [its] disposal" to avert any further Russian actions in Ukraine.<sup>109</sup> Johnson has emphasized his government's opposition to the **Nord Stream 2** pipeline, citing the need to break from the Russian energy market and the security risks it poses for Europe and its eastern neighborhood.<sup>110</sup>

## FUTURE

Russia's ongoing actions in Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic region will likely command the lion's share of the UK's security focus in 2022, whether in the form of increased troop deployments, weapons and intelligence sharing, or diplomatic and economic sanctions. Increasing Russian aggression to the east, however, complicates the UK's tilt toward the Indo-Pacific region as a member of AUKUS. As Admiral James Glodrick said, "the real problem is that if Britain comes to the Indo-Pacific in a big way, even for a few months, there will be practically nothing left in the naval locker for contingencies closer to home. This matters when Russia's behavior in

eastern Europe remains problematic and western Europe needs reassurance and support."<sup>111</sup> To this point, the Integrated Review states that "the precondition for Global Britain is the safety of [the UK's] citizens at home and the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, where the bulk of the UK's security focus will remain."<sup>112</sup>





SECURITY

## Where do the UK's political parties stand?



Labour

Liberal Democrats

SNP

Support European military cooperation and integration



Support NATO 2% spending target



Support U.S. involvement in European security and defense



Increase defense spending



Nuclear defense and sharing



Support for non-proliferation



Support a nuclear deal with Iran



Support Nord Stream 2



Sanctions against human rights abusers



1 - SNP opposed membership until 2012. Party remains split.

Support

Mixed Views


Oppose

No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Britons find NATO important to the security of their country?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important





An aerial photograph showing a stark contrast between a bright, snow-covered mountain range on the left and a dark, rugged, and rocky coastline on the right. The snow-covered peaks are jagged and detailed, while the coastline is dark and textured with visible rock formations and some small inlets. The overall color palette is dominated by the white of the snow and the deep blues and blacks of the rocky terrain.

# climate



## PAST

In 1988, *The New York Times* famously published an article headlined “Global Warming Has Begun.”<sup>113</sup> A year later the UN established its Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. President Clinton signed the **Kyoto Protocol** in 1997, but President George W. Bush pulled out of the agreement in 2001, claiming it would undermine the U.S. economy.<sup>114</sup> The Obama administration joined the **Paris Agreement** in 2016, but President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out in 2017. These seesaw policies damaged diplomatic relations, with many concluding that the U.S. was not a reliable climate partner.

## PRESENT

The Biden administration has made climate change one of its top priorities. Several components of the recently passed **Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill** address the issue. These include investing in public transit and vehicle infrastructure, clean drinking water, and resilient infrastructure.<sup>115</sup>

The Biden administration’s first executive order was to recommit the U.S. to the Paris Agreement. Because the current administration takes a whole society approach to climate change, several agencies are tackling climate change simultaneously. In April 2021, the Department of the Treasury launched a climate hub and appointed its first-ever climate counselor.<sup>116</sup> They are developing policies for climate transition finance, climate-related economic and tax policy, and climate-related financial risks. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen spearheaded an initiative to align economic priorities with climate aspirations. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has identified climate change as a top security threat to be tackled—as made clear by the Department of Defense (DoD) Climate Risk Analysis released in October 2021. The DoD has identified climate change as a national security threat since 2010, but Austin

sees it as a component for “risk analyses, strategy development, planning, modeling, simulation, and war gaming.”<sup>117</sup>

The Biden administration participated actively in the October 2021 **United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26)** in Glasgow, showing that the U.S. intends to be an active player in the international fight against climate change. In his speech at COP26, Biden said: “We’ll demonstrate to the world the United States is not only back at the table but hopefully leading by the power of our example.” But Europe continues to request increased coordination with the U.S. in tackling this

## FUTURE


The Senate is currently considering the **Build Back Better Plan**, which is billed as the largest effort to fight climate change in American history. Although it is unlikely to ever pass due to partisan gridlock, the plan would have a notable impact on the fight against climate change.<sup>120</sup> One of its proposals is for the establishment of a Civilian Climate Corps. Modeled after President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Civilian Conservation Corps, it aims to generate a new wave of green jobs that would push forward the Biden administration’s vision for a green transition.

The Biden administration has considered several initiatives inspired by the European Green Deal. For example, the EU is in the process of implementing a **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)** to encourage sustainable trade and promote green investment. Biden has instructed U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry to examine the effects of pursuing this unilateral effort because “by evaluating the European one we’re going to have a sense of what we might

issue. Executive Vice President of the EU Commission Frans Timmermans, who is leading the European Green Deal, has called on Washington to be more transparent with their plans so that the fight can truly be a joint one.<sup>118</sup> At local levels, this seems to be achievable. For example, California has negotiated several bilateral climate deals with EU countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain).<sup>119</sup> These deals, which range from sustainable economic initiatives to climate positive trade deals, reflect successful transatlantic partnership on climate action.

or might not embrace.”<sup>121</sup> The EU is also adopting U.S. initiatives. For example, the newly instituted **European Innovation Council**, which focuses on fostering innovation and growth technologies in the fight against climate change, models itself after the **ARPA-E (Advanced Research Project Agency – Energy)**. The Biden administration recently proposed expanding ARPA-E efforts and building out **ARPA-C (Climate)**, which would be dedicated to innovative climate technologies.






CLIMATE

## Where do the U.S.' political parties stand?


		
Support Paris Climate Accord		
Carbon neutrality by 2050		
Support CO2 taxation		
Support nuclear energy		
Support coal		
Support natural gas		
Support hydrogen		
Support wind energy		
Support investments in renewable energy		
Support Just Transition Fund		

 Support    Mixed Views    Oppose    No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Americans think their government should take more or less action to combat climate change?

### Overall Perceptions




### Age Groups

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More




### Education Levels

Positive Perceptions: Much More + Somewhat More




### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More



### Geography

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More







## PAST

Germany's climate policy has been closely tied to its so-called "**Energiewende**," or energy transition. The Energiewende, originally rooted in Germany's efforts to phase out nuclear energy, has evolved over several decades to contain comprehensive national energy and climate goals, including emission-reduction targets, phasing out of coal usage and production, and expanding clean energies.<sup>122</sup> In 2007 and 2010, the German government introduced the latest installment of the Energiewende with a series of climate and renewable energy targets for 2020 and 2050. By 2015, however, reports showed that the country was in danger of missing those targets.<sup>123</sup>

The Energiewende has thus faced criticism for failing to reach emission reduction targets, most notably in 2021, when the country's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions rose to the highest levels in 30 years. It has also been costly, as the government has paid subsidies for building out renewables, a policy that could change under new leadership in Berlin. Still, despite the setbacks Germany has faced, its efforts to combat climate change have made it a leading power within the transatlantic community. The Merkel government introduced Germany's first climate law in 2019, the Climate Action Law, which has introduced protocols for both private and public sector entities in maintaining climate targets. The country has also started transatlantic initiatives like the **Transatlantic Climate Bridge** between Europe and North America (the U.S. and Canada), promoting international exchange on climate and energy matters.<sup>124</sup>

## PRESENT

The new **traffic light coalition** is being branded as Germany's most green government yet. The December 2021 coalition agreement between the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Greens, and Free Democratic Party (FDP) demonstrates a comprehensive set of long and short-term climate and

## Transatlantic Primer

energy targets for the country. At the heart of the agreement is putting Germany on track for the **1.5-degree Celsius goal** set by the **Paris Climate Agreement**. One of the most notable targets is phasing out all coal by 2030, eight years earlier than originally planned. The coalition agreement also includes targets for renewable energies, CO2 pricing, power grids, transport, construction, and agriculture. The government is also reiterating German support for the EU **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or CBAM**.

The introduction of the Green Party, back to government for the first time since 2005, has influ-

## FUTURE

Germany's traffic light coalition places the country in a unique position to be a climate leader over the next four years. The inclusion of a strong Green contingent will probably ensure that substantive policy action buttresses the rhetoric of the new government in Berlin. The new government will aim to further reform the already progressive and comprehensive Climate Action Law to include stricter measures to ensure national climate and energy targets are reached. As part of the coalition agreement, all ministries will have to perform so-called "climate checks" on legislative proposals to assess climate impact and ensure compatibility with the country's climate goals.<sup>126</sup> Germany's last six nuclear power reactors are also set to be de-commissioned by the end of 2022. Robert Habeck has said that "welfare with climate protection" will underlie the policies of Germany's new government.<sup>127</sup> The coalition agreement did not make specific mention of the United States in its climate goals, focusing largely on European initiatives. Green Party Foreign Minister and party co-chairwoman Annalena Baerbock has pushed for a "common European response" to climate ac-

enced the ambitious climate and energy sections of the coalition agreement. It has also impacted a key ministry. The former Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy has been rebranded to become the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Protection, an office now headed by Green Party co-leader Robert Habeck. The ministry is responsible for renewable energies, the power sector, energy networks, and the federal Climate Action Law.<sup>125</sup> The Greens also have control over four other key ministries including the Foreign Office, Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection, and, finally, the Food and Agriculture Ministry.

tion.<sup>128</sup> However, the coalition agreement makes specific mention of working with the United States to set a standard for global sustainability efforts.

Although Germany will take a more leading role in climate policy in 2022 and beyond, there is still room for contention among allies in the new year. The new German government's commitment to using natural gas as a transitional energy source while building out renewables doubles down on its usage of the Russian gas market. The coalition agreement did not include language on the as-yet uncompleted **Nord Stream 2** pipeline or make mention of Russian energy, of which Germany is Europe's largest consumer. The controversial project is still a sticking point among transatlantic allies, but also among Germany's new governing parties, specifically with the SPD largely in support and the Greens and FDP largely in opposition.<sup>129</sup> The future of the pipeline is uncertain, but will undoubtedly test Berlin's new leaders on both the European and transatlantic stages throughout the new year, especially in light of Russia's recent aggression toward Ukraine.







CLIMATE

## Where do Germany's political parties stand?

	SPD	CDU CSU	BÜNDNIS 90 DIE GRÜNEN	Freie Demokraten FDP	Alternative Deutschland	DIE LINKE.
Support Paris Climate Accord	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
Carbon neutrality by 2050	✓ <sub>1</sub>	✓ <sub>1</sub>	✓ <sub>2</sub>	✓	✗	✓ <sub>3</sub>
Support EU Green Deal	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	... <sub>4</sub>
Support nuclear energy	✗	—	✗	... <sub>5</sub>	✗	✗
Support coal	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Support natural gas	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗
Support hydrogen	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support wind energy	✓	✓	✓	... <sub>6</sub>	✗	✓
Support investments in renewable energy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
Support EU Just Transition Fund	✓	—	✓	—	✗	✓


1- by 2045 | 2- in the next 20 years | 3- by 2035 | 4- believe it is not ambitious enough | 5- support, under certain conditions | 6- support, but view as unreliable

✓ Support    ... Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

### Transatlantic Primer


## Do Germans think their government should take more or less action to combat climate change?

### Overall Perceptions




### Age Groups

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More




### Education Levels

Positive Perceptions: Much More + Somewhat More




### Geography

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More



### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More





## PAST

In 2001, France passed a law that made climate change a “national priority.”<sup>130</sup> In 2005, after two years of public debate, it adopted the POPE Act,<sup>131</sup> a law that defined national climate and explicitly identifies climate change as a priority of its national energy policy.<sup>132</sup> These efforts bore some fruit: between 1990 and 2013, France cut its greenhouse gas emissions by more than 10 percent, exceeding the expectations set out in the 1997 **Kyoto Protocol**.<sup>133</sup> France has long been one of the lowest greenhouse gas emitters, chiefly because it derives over 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear energy.<sup>134</sup> France hosted the 21st **United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21)** in 2015, where nations from around the world signed the Paris Agreement.

## PRESENT

President Macron has championed climate change as a priority of his presidency. He has not shied away from standing up to the U.S. in his war on climate change. Urging everyone to “make our planet great again,” Macron offered funding to foreign climate experts (specifically targeting U.S. scientists) in response to former President Donald Trump pulling the U.S. out of the **Paris Agreement**.<sup>135</sup> While the French have appreciated actions such as these in the international arena, they have been less enthusiastic about domestic climate policies. The **Gilets Jaunes** protest movement was sparked by the government’s attempt to raise fuel prices as a means of promoting sustainable modes of travel, like cycling or public transportation, over cars. This led to months of backlash, with critics accusing Macron of being disconnected from the lives of ordinary citizens who might travel long distances by car to get to work—only to see their entire monthly salary spent on gas.

But President Macron’s domestic policies to combat climate change have been successful in several

other areas, as in the implementation of a **circular economy**. A ban on plastic packaging will be accomplished in multiple phases. So far, single use items like plastic cutlery, Styrofoam take out boxes, and plastic cups have been banned in France. These efforts will help eliminate more than 1 billion items of unnecessary packaging per year.<sup>136</sup> In

## FUTURE

With the Biden Administration having recommitted the U.S. to the Paris Agreement, President Macron has applauded the administration’s efforts to push for further climate action. Now Macron is seeking to work with the U.S. toward increased cooperation with China, with France believing there is potential to deescalate tensions.

At the EU level, France has had an ongoing debate about integrating nuclear power into the taxonomy on green finance. Recently, in a change of heart from his previous position, President Macron has been very vocal about his support for nuclear power and the green transition—much to the dismay of many of his European counterparts, who believe nuclear waste is harmful to the environment. With President Macron assuming the Council presidency this year, he may use his position to exert more influence. The EU adopted its first climate and energy package in 2008 under the French presidency; this work will continue under President Macron, who has been an active supporter of the European Green Deal.

Climate policy will remain a priority of National Rally leader Marine Le Pen ahead of the 2022 presidential election. Her platform includes a conservative ecology that aims to preserve local industry and condemn big polluters at the global level. This is a massive shift from her 2017 plat-

July 2021, the Senate passed an extensive climate package that expands on existing climate initiatives to instill sustainability as a way of life. The package addresses pollution, plastic packaging, fossil fuels, public transportation, and several other issues.<sup>137</sup>

form, which barely mentioned ecology and climate change—aside from comments on the preservation of nature and defense of animals.<sup>138</sup> But many argue that her current position on the environment, which she says has been pushed to its limit by the impact of globalization, hides a broader agenda that is anti-immigration and promotes a more right-wing form of environmentalism.<sup>139</sup> Les Républicains presidential candidate Valerie Pécresse’s platform focuses heavily on the future of sustainability. Her climate ambitions include developing renewable energies like hydrogen and expanding infrastructure for electric vehicles.





## CLIMATE

# Where do France's political parties stand?

	LA RÉPUBLIQUE En Marche!	les RÉpublicains	Rassemblement National	R! RECONQUÊTE	PS SOCIAL ÉCOLOGIE	La France insoumise
Support Paris Climate Accord	✓	✓	✗	—	✓	✓
Carbon neutrality by 2050	✓	✓	✗	—	✓	✓
Support EU Green Deal	✓	—	✗	—	✓	—
Support nuclear energy	✓	✓	✓	✓	⋯ <sub>1</sub>	✗
Support coal	✗	✗	—	✗	✗	✗
Support natural gas	✓	—	✓	—	—	—
Support hydrogen	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support wind energy	✓	⋯ <sub>2</sub>	✗	✗	—	✗
Support investments in renewable energy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support EU Just Transition Fund	✓	—	—	—	✓	—


1- Open to exit from nuclear energy | 2- Calls for ban on installations of wind turbines in certain zones

✓ Support
 ⋯ Mixed Views
 ✗ Oppose
 — No Official Position

## Transatlantic Primer


# Do the French think their government should take more or less action to combat climate change?

## Overall Perceptions




## Socioeconomic Status

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More



## Age Groups

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More




## Political Parties

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More



## Geography

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More







## PAST

Italy is one of Europe's renewable energy and energy efficiency champions.<sup>140</sup> Its energy intensity, or the amount of energy expended to produce a given level of output, is 18 percent lower than the EU's 28 percent average. It is also Europe's second largest producer of renewable energy.<sup>141</sup> In December 2016, the **Paris Agreement** entered into force, and in 2019 the government disbursed loans at a subsidized rate for combating climate change in accordance with the Kyoto Fund.<sup>142</sup> Nevertheless, Italy is one of the most climate vulnerable countries in the EU as it continues to transition its industries and infrastructure to meet greener standards. Several business sectors have also prioritized greener practices, notably with the **New Green Deal for Italy**, a manifesto signed in 2020 by more than 100 companies. The energy company Eni's climate response is the most comprehensive in Europe and it is the only multinational to have set an absolute target to reduce emissions (including gas) by 80 percent by 2050, opening the debate about Italy's energy future.<sup>143</sup> In the past, Italy failed to take sufficient action on climate issues.<sup>144</sup> Previous governments, including the Giuseppe Conte administration, ignored legal standards addressing climate change, a phenomenon known as "abusivismo." Current Italian PM Mario Draghi has insisted that his government will be more effective in addressing the issue.

## PRESENT

Italy supports the European Green Deal and plans to raise its own climate profile, as reflected in the current draft of its **Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR)**. The PNRR focuses on supporting the green transition through renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable agriculture. It has also established a special envoy for climate change to ensure more effective participation in international events and negoti-

## Transatlantic Primer

ations on environmental issues, though an envoy has yet to be appointed.

Italy is a **circular economy** leader in Europe,<sup>145</sup> in large part due to its technological advances. It hosts some of the world's most innovative recycling technology, including the only plant producing butanediol, an organic compound produced from sugars, to make compostable bioplastics. During its **G20** Presidency, Italy's first minister for

ecological transition, Roberto Cingolani, hosted a July 2021 meeting of energy and climate ministers to strengthen the green multilateral agenda ahead of **COP26**, which Italy cohosted.<sup>146</sup> But at COP26, in an effort to protect their auto industries, neither Germany nor Italy signed the pledge to ban internal combustion engines by 2035. Both COP26 and the G20 meetings left much to be desired in terms of strong, progressive commitments.

## FUTURE

Italy has great potential to seize economic opportunities created by the European Green Deal, especially during its recovery from the pandemic-induced recession. The main objectives of Italy's environmental policies are represented in its **pPTE** proposal, including a 55 percent reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 2030 compared to 1990, and the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050.<sup>147</sup> The pPTE requires a 72 percent contribution of renewable energies by 2030, when at least 50 percent of engines produced must be electric. Italy has also adopted a long-term strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, while the **PNIEC (Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan)** establishes a permanent inter-ministerial table for the climate emergency.

By June 2022 Italy plans to publish the new **National Strategy for the Circular Economy**, an update of the previous document published in 2017 to reflect the commitments adopted within the parameters of the Paris Agreement and the **UN Sustainable Development Goals**. The new strategy will also cover eco-design and product innovation, bioeconomy, blue economy, and critical raw materials, with the aim of securing 50 percent waste prevention by 2040.<sup>148</sup> Italy's PNRR also addresses measures to achieve these objectives through its **Green Revolution and Ecological**

**Transition**. The government will allot €70 billion and more than 31 percent of the total amount of the PNRR toward attaining the objectives of the European Green Deal, which calls for a reduction of 33 percent of annual greenhouse gas emission by 2030.<sup>149</sup> Meanwhile, Italy's **"Climate Decree"** is mainly aimed at adopting urgent measures for a national policy to combat climate change and improve air quality.<sup>150</sup>

In June 2021, Italy was granted a large portion of the **EU Recovery Fund**, a total of €191.5 billion, which Prime Minister Draghi has pledged will make Italy "more just, more competitive, and more sustainable in its growth," with over one-third of the funds earmarked for projects supporting climate goals.<sup>151</sup> Part of the proceeds from the auctions of CO<sub>2</sub> emission quotas (€609 million) will support renewable energy and energy efficiency. "This is just a beginning... the challenge now is the implementation of the plan, we need to make sure the funds are spent, but above all spent well," Draghi said.<sup>152</sup> And according to a 2021 survey, Italians perceive the climate emergency as the main threat to their country's security, with citizens more concerned about climate than the pandemic. The real challenge will now be for Italy to equip its institutions adequately with the tools to integrate climate-based transitions into future policies.





## CLIMATE

# Where do Italy's political parties stand?

					
Support Paris Climate Accord	✓	✓	⋯ <sub>1</sub>	✓	✓
Carbon neutrality by 2050	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Support EU Green Deal	✓	✓	✗	—	⋯ <sub>2</sub>
Support nuclear energy	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Support coal	✗	✗	⋯ <sub>3</sub>	✗	✗
Support natural gas	✓ <sub>4</sub>	✓ <sub>5</sub>	✓	✓	✓
Support hydrogen	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support wind energy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support investments in renewable energy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support EU Just Transition Fund	—	✓	—	—	—


1- Party abstained to ratify accord, while party leader voted against | 2- Asked to postpone until end of COVID-19 crisis | 3- Calls for partial replacement of coal | 4- Called for ban on trans-adriatic pipeline over environmental concerns before, but ultimately approved under PM Giuseppe Conte | 5- Supports gas in energy transition

✓ Support    ⋯ Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

## Transatlantic Primer


# Do Italians think their government should take more or less action to combat climate change?

## Overall Perceptions




## Education

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More




## Age Groups

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More



## Geography

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More



## Political Parties

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More







## PAST

The UK was the first country in the world to produce a legally-binding national commitment to cutting greenhouse gas emissions, the 2008 Climate Change Act.<sup>153</sup> The UK Parliament passed the act by a near unanimous vote (463-5), a testament to the country's longstanding bipartisan position on climate policy.<sup>154</sup> Before leaving the EU, the UK was considered a leading force on the continent, having influenced other member states to enact similar legislation.

The Climate Change Act functions as the framework for the country's various responses to combating climate change. The original goal of the act sought to cut emissions by 80 percent by 2050, but the government amended the target in 2019 to become net zero by 2050. The UK's devolved administrations—Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—are subject to the Climate Change Act, but can also adopt separate legislation. Scotland, for example, enacted its own climate change act in 2009, setting its net zero target for 2045; in 2016, Wales enacted legislation to reduce carbon emissions by at least 80 percent by 2050, following up in 2021 by adopting legislation to meet the UK-wide goal of 100 percent<sup>155, 156</sup>; and Northern Ireland has been mulling over its first-ever climate legislation to either reach an 82 percent reduction in emissions by 2050 or reach net zero by 2045.<sup>157</sup> The UK, as a whole, has reached several emission-reduction targets set by the **Kyoto Protocol** and has committed itself to cutting emissions by 68 percent by 2030 under the **Paris Climate Accord**, one of the most ambitious goals of any major global economy.<sup>158</sup>

## PRESENT

The targets set under the Climate Change Act are closely monitored by the Climate Change Committee, an independent body tasked with reviewing the country's progress on its national climate goals. Every five years, the UK government is required to produce a re-

## Transatlantic Primer

port, the Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA), detailing current and future risks, as well as opportunities created by climate change. In response to the findings of the CCRA, the UK government then produces the National Adaption Programme (NAP) that details action items the government will undertake over the next five years. The NAP is only valid for England, while the devolved administrations publish their own adaptation reports. In June 2021, the Climate Change Committee (CCC) conducted its third technical assessment of the country's progress and found that its adaptation to climate risks were largely underfunded and ignored by the UK government.<sup>159, 160</sup> The head of the committee said: "We have really wanted to get across the extent of the climate risks we face in the UK and the genuinely poor extent of planning that we see for many of them. Our preparations for climate change in this country are not keeping pace with the extent of the risks that we face."<sup>161</sup>

## FUTURE

The UK has met its carbon target budgets since 2008, with climate experts predicting the country will outperform in 2022.<sup>165</sup> That accomplishment and the progress made on other targets will be assessed under the 2022 Climate Change Risk Assessment. The results of the report will impact the recommendations set forth in the 2023 National Adaptation Programme and other adaptation reports enacted by the devolved administrations.

In 2022, the UK will likely remain a leading force on combating climate change. Despite the shortcomings raised by the CCC in 2021, the 2022 Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI)—an independent monitoring tool measuring greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy, energy use, and climate policy—ranks the country seventh overall (spots one through three are left empty, as no country performs well enough to achieve "an over-

Nevertheless, the UK is, relatively speaking, a leader in climate action. It has built the world's largest offshore wind industry and, as of 2021, has reduced its emissions by 44 percent from 1990 levels. Since leaving the EU, it has adopted its own **emissions trading scheme**, which mirrors the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) to which it formerly belonged.<sup>162</sup> The government has introduced the Carbon Price Support, requiring UK power generators to pay a minimum carbon price, and hosted the COP26 summit in Glasgow. Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that his government would pursue an ambitious set of goals: ending the sale of gas and diesel-fueled vehicles by 2030; closing all coal and gas-fired power plants by 2035; and halting the sale of all fossil-fueled home heating systems by 2035.<sup>163</sup> Climate experts, however, cited inadequacies in the UK's current policies in financing, backtracking on phasing out coal, and private sector interest groups that have undermined government action.<sup>164</sup>

all high rating").<sup>166</sup> Following COP26, Prime Minister Johnson issued a joint commitment with President Joe Biden and the European Commission's President Ursula von der Leyen to address climate change through infrastructure development with a five-point plan focused on resilience, partnership, quality-assurance, finance, and economic recovery. The trio also called on countries around the globe to "make similar commitments and take action to spur a global transformation towards reliable, climate-smart infrastructure."<sup>167</sup> Furthermore, the UK, along with the U.S., France, Germany and the EU announced the Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa, an initiative that aims to help the country de-carbonize its economy.<sup>168</sup> These are prime example of ways in which the UK and its transatlantic partners are pushing climate cooperation on the international stage.





CLIMATE

## Where do the UK's political parties stand?

		 Labour	 Liberal Democrats	 SNP
Support Paris Climate Accord	✓	✓	✓	✓
Carbon neutrality by 2050	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support nuclear energy	✓	✓	—	✗
Support coal	...	✗	✗	✗
Support natural gas	✓	—	✗	✓
Support hydrogen	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support wind energy	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support investments in renewable energy	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support Just Transition Fund	—	✓	✓	✓



Support



Mixed Views



Oppose




No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Britons think their government should take more or less action to combat climate change?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More




### Age Groups

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More




### Political Parties

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More



### Geography

Want More Action: Much More + Somewhat More





A photograph of the Shanghai skyline at sunset, featuring the Oriental Pearl Tower and the Shanghai Tower. The word "china" is overlaid in white, lowercase letters on the right side of the image. The sky is a mix of orange, pink, and blue, and the city lights are visible. The water in the foreground reflects the skyline and the sky. There are diagonal blue and white stripes on the left side of the image.

china



## PAST

U.S. policy toward China has in recent years become increasingly comprehensive and contentious, expanding beyond the traditional trade relationship as the latter has become a global superpower. In 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the U.S.-China Relations Act, paving the way for China to join the **World Trade Organization (WTO)** a year later. By 2006, China had become its second largest trade partner. In 2008, China surpassed Japan as the U.S.' largest creditor. In November 2011, the Obama administration announced its pivot toward the Asia-Pacific, focusing on "increased investment-diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise" in the region.<sup>169</sup> Shortly after that, President Obama announced the creation of the **Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)** to counter Chinese economic influence in the region, a bloc the U.S. subsequently left under the Trump administration.

Tensions between Washington and Beijing heightened during the Trump presidency due to a bitter trade war. The U.S. imposed wide-ranging tariffs on \$200 billion worth of Chinese goods, banned Huawei 5G technologies, and labeled China a currency manipulator, while China retaliated with its own tariffs. The Trump administration also solidified U.S. support for Taiwan, voiced support for Hong Kong's democracy movement, and closed diplomatic missions throughout China. But by the end of the Trump presidency, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the administration's engagement with China had "failed."<sup>170</sup>

## PRESENT

Shortly after President Biden's inauguration, the new administration rejoined the **World Health Organization (WHO)**, from which the Trump administration had withdrawn in 2020, claiming the organization was biased toward China following the COVID-19 outbreak. Tensions between the U.S. and China extend further into security, human rights, technology, and trade matters. Within a day of entering the White House, the Biden administration labeled Beijing's action against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang as a "genocide," a move the UK parliament followed just three months later.<sup>171, 172</sup> In security terms, the Biden administration has sought to strengthen the Quad—the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia—and to strengthen resolve among like-minded allies in the Indo-Pacific region. In September 2021, the U.S. joined Australia and the UK in forming the **AUKUS** alliance, strengthening its security presence in the Indo-Pacific region. As part of the deal, the U.S. is supplying nuclear submarines to the Australian navy. Technology remains a key point of worry in Washington, as U.S. technology companies engage with the Chinese market. This has sparked

national security concerns, specifically data privacy and cyberthreats. U.S.-China trade relations remain contentious, although the Biden administration has lifted the sanctions the Trump administration imposed in 2018.

Despite foreign relations setbacks, partly stemming from the AUKUS alliance, President Biden has generally found consensus with European leaders regarding the need to take a tougher approach to China. In response to China's implementation of the 2020 National Security Law in Hong Kong, both Washington and Brussels imposed sanctions on Chinese officials. The U.S. is engaging its European counterparts on China through the EU and the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**. Brussels and Washington held an EU-U.S. dialogue regarding China in November 2021; that same month NATO released an unprecedented statement on China, labeling it a "global security challenge."<sup>173</sup> President Biden also held virtual talks with Chinese Premier Xi Jinping in November but, rather than producing a clear transition toward rapprochement, the two sides reiterated policy positions that are largely at odds.

## FUTURE

As 2021 came to a close, the U.S. ruffled feathers in Beijing for its inclusion of Taiwan at President Biden's December 2021 Democracy Summit. The U.S. approach toward China is unlikely to change in 2022. Transatlantic dynamics vis-à-vis China are, however, in a state of flux, with fundamental differences between the U.S. and European approaches. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who held contentious talks with Chinese officials in

Alaska shortly after the inauguration, called China "the biggest geopolitical test of the 21<sup>st</sup> century."<sup>174</sup> Biden said last year that "the CCP under Xi presents the single greatest external threat to our way of life."<sup>175</sup> The language from Europe is far more moderate. There is, however, an increasing convergence of opinion between the U.S. and Europe on taking a tougher approach to China, especially on issues like human rights and trade practices.











CHINA

## Where do the U.S.' political parties stand?


		
Promote fair economic relations		
Protect networks, data, and high-tech from China		
Promote transatlantic cooperation vis-à-vis China		
Cooperate with China on climate change		
Support Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)		
Condemnation of human rights violations		
Preserve Hong Kong's autonomy		
Support Taiwan		

 Support    Mixed Views    Oppose    No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## How do Americans perceive China's influence in global affairs?

### Overall Perceptions




### Age Groups

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Education Levels

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Political Parties

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative



### Geography

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative





## PAST

During Angela Merkel's 16-year tenure as Germany's chancellor, the country largely took a soft approach toward China, characterized best by economic engagement. For the past five years, China has been Germany's largest trade partner (combined imports and exports). Berlin's economic interests have thus played a dominant role in how it approaches Beijing. Year-on-year, over half the EU's exports to China came from Germany alone. Merkel's government received criticism, both domestically and internationally, for largely overlooking China's human rights abuses and climate policy inaction in favor of maintaining close economic ties. In the context of transatlantic relations, Berlin, along with many other European capitals, has been caught in the middle between China and the United States. Germany, especially, has tried to play a balancing act between the two global powers in order to preserve its economic interests. As Washington's approach toward China has become more hardline, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Germany's noncommittal stance has become increasingly unsustainable.

## PRESENT

Following Germany's federal election in September 2021, all eyes have been on the potential impact of Chancellor Olaf Scholz's government on the country's policy toward Beijing. Germany and France have traditionally shaped the EU's policy toward China and this remains the case. However, as the new **traffic light coalition** (SPD, Greens, and FDP) takes the reins, it is predominantly focusing its efforts on domestic policy matters like long-awaited investments in digitalization and renewable energy.

Still, the November 2021 coalition agreement between the parties signals a desire to shift Germany's China policy away from the Merkel years. The

## Transatlantic Primer

agreement states that cooperation with Beijing is "bound to compliance with human rights and rule of law," specifically citing Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. Germany has also officially adopted the EU "partner, competitor, and systemic rival" stance toward China.<sup>176</sup> The agreement goes further by recognizing the need for a more comprehensive China policy and the need to develop it in accordance with the EU. A welcome sign for trans-

## FUTURE

Despite the hard language in the coalition agreement, views among the new government's party leaders differ. Chancellor Scholz of the SPD represents continuity and has shrugged off calls for economic decoupling from China; FDP leader and Finance Minister Christian Lindner has promoted human rights, but wishes to maintain close economic ties with Beijing; and Green Party Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has supported taking a tougher approach to China on its human rights record, separate from Germany's trade policy.<sup>178</sup>

Despite Germany's economic dependence on China, the German business community has expressed worries over Beijing's reluctance to adopt fair economic practices that promote healthy competition. The **Federation of German Industries (BDI)** published a report in 2019 that suggested Germany (and Europe) should rethink its relationship with China and take a tougher approach.<sup>179</sup> The results of the report still hold relevance moving forward and show that even Europe's top trade partner with China has reservations. While traditionally German auto and industrial machinery industries have made large profits in China, Beijing is now outpacing Germany in electric vehicle innovation and is close behind in producing high-level industrial equipment of its own. China is now the

atlanticists is that the new government promotes increased cooperation with "like-minded democracies," the U.S. included. During the negotiations, a spokesperson of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) said that Europe's neutral stance between Beijing and Washington, D.C., is untenable and that, while Europe must pursue its own interests, its place is in a close partnership with the U.S.<sup>177</sup>

second largest exporter of such goods, just behind Germany.<sup>180</sup> These changing trade dynamics could impact Germany's approach toward China moving forward. Furthermore, while Chancellor Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron attempted to push through the **Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)** in 2020, the Greens and FDP currently oppose the deal. Now that the Greens head the Economic and Foreign ministries, a more values-based approach toward China in this regard might prevail.

Still, as Germany's new government takes its first steps, many fear it will perhaps adopt a tougher line toward China in some areas, but not to the extent that its economic relationship is threatened. As Germany continues to rebuild from the pandemic, a robust trade relationship with China is perhaps more important than ever. Germany remains economically intertwined with China. This precarious position will potentially hinder the German government's ability to put more action behind its rhetoric, even under new leadership in Berlin.













CHINA

## Where do Germany's political parties stand?

						
Further develop EU-China strategy	✓	✓	✓	✓	—	—
Ratify the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)	✓	—	✗	...	—	—
Promote fair economic relations	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	—
Protect networks, data, and high-tech from China	—	✓	✓	—	—	—
Promote transatlantic cooperation vis-à-vis China	—	✓	✓	—	—	✗
Cooperate with China on climate change	✓	—	✓	—	—	—
Support Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)	—	... <sub>1</sub>	... <sub>1</sub>	... <sub>1</sub>	✗	—
Condemnation of human rights violations	✓	—	✓	✓	—	—
Preserve Hong Kong's autonomy	✓	—	✓	✓	—	—
Support Taiwan	—	—	✓	✓	—	—


1- Wants a European alternative

✓ Support    ... Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## How do Germans perceive China's influence in global affairs?

### Overall Perceptions




### Age Groups

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Education Levels

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Geography

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative



### Political Parties

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative







## PAST

France has long been an Indo-Pacific power due to the overseas territories it holds in this region. The French **2017 Strategic Review of Defense and National Security** addressed concerns over attempts at controlling strategic areas in the Indo-Pacific. These statements indirectly called out questionable Chinese activity in this region. While France's military approach to China has veered on the more cautious side, its economic policy has been a bit bolder in defending French economic priorities. After initially signaling interest in signing on to China's **Belt and Road Initiative**, President Macron told Premier Xi Jinping at a 2019 summit that "Silk Road cooperation must work in both directions."<sup>181</sup> The 2019 meeting, which took place in France, was the first time a European leader opted to engage as a European-bloc with China. President Macron invited Angela Merkel, then chancellor of Germany, and Jean-Claude Juncker, then EU Commission president, to discuss Sino-European cooperation alongside Premier Xi Jinping. This is in line with Macron's approach to empowering Europe as a vehicle for broader geopolitical aspirations.

## PRESENT

In its 2021 **Strategic Update**<sup>182</sup>, France describes China as a "systemic rival to the EU, while remaining an economic competitor and sometimes an important diplomatic partner." The term "systemic rival" is not new terminology; the EU has been using it since 2019.

Prior to **AUKUS**—the trilateral security pact between the UK, Australia, and the U.S.—France advocated a multilateral approach to China in the Indo-Pacific. Militarily and diplomatically, it wanted to be a "balancing power" in the region, opting for a flexible approach based on a "wise comprehensive strategic partnership with Beijing."<sup>183</sup> This was intended to oppose the strict, "Cold War" lens that Washington tends to favor.

## Transatlantic Primer

In May 2021, France participated in the Jeanne D'Arc 21—a crucial multilateral exercise alongside the U.S., Australia, and Japan. But Australia's decision to purchase submarines from the U.S., instead of from France, caused a bitter sense of betrayal and exclusion and undermined France's Indo-Pacific strategy. The U.S. has signaled its interest in reconciliation by sending both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Vice President Kamala Harris on official visits to Paris, but France continues to emphasize a need for "**strategic autonomy**" and a renewed push for decreased dependence on its transatlantic counterpart.

President Macron has also distanced himself from the Biden administration's push to pursue action against China via **NATO**, with Macron recently reminding the organization that "China is not in the North Atlantic."<sup>184</sup> The French president emphasized that Chinese influence is "much larger than just the military issue. It is economic. It is strategic. It is about values.

## FUTURE

As France assumes the **European Council presidency** this year, one of the EU's priorities, and of its **G7** Partners, is to build an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the coming months the European Commission will list specific projects to challenge Chinese influence in Europe.

The candidates for France's upcoming presidential election vary in their approach to China. Marine Le Pen, presidential candidate of the far-right National Rally, has offered effusive praise of former U.S. President Donald Trump's China policies and would most likely pursue similar protectionist measures. Regarding human rights, she has said that she would condemn China,

It is technological. And we should avoid distracting NATO, which already has many challenges."<sup>185</sup>

President Macron views China as both a competitor and, in certain respects, as a potential ally. Macron has emphasized four priorities for engaging with China.<sup>186</sup> In terms of security, President Macron prioritizes working with permanent members of the **UN Security Council** (China, France, the U.S., Russia, and the UK) to find areas of cooperation; On climate, China is a signatory to the Paris Agreement, which, Macron asserts, means it can be a partner in the fight against climate change; On trade matters, Macron wishes to strengthen protections for intellectual property and equitable trade through organizations like the **WTO** and **OECD**. Finally, regarding human rights, Macron has said that China's willingness to accept certain **International Labor Organization** regulations is a welcome development that can open the door to cooperation.<sup>187</sup>



but refrain from imposing sanctions, which she believes are not an effective tool. While Macron believes it is crucial to maintain open relations with China and engage in realistic cooperation (he famously stated that it was time for "European naïveté" to be over), Le Pen would distance France from Beijing.<sup>188</sup> Republican presidential candidate Valerie Pécresse's policy regarding China would be more open. She has emphasized that her relationship with Washington, Moscow, and Beijing would be inspired by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel's approach. She has also advocated for stopping all French developmental aid to China and recognizing Beijing as a military and economic power.<sup>189</sup>





CHINA

## Where do France's political parties stand?

						
Further develop EU-China strategy	✓	⋯ <sub>1</sub>	✗	—	—	—
Ratify the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)	⋯ <sub>2</sub>	✗	✗	—	—	—
Promote fair economic relations	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	—
Protect networks, data, and high-tech from China	⋯ <sub>3</sub>	—	—	—	—	—
Promote transatlantic cooperation vis-à-vis China	⋯	⋯	—	—	⋯ <sub>4</sub>	✗
Cooperate with China on climate change	✓	—	—	—	—	—
Support Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)	✗ <sub>5</sub>	—	—	—	⋯ <sub>6</sub>	—
Condemnation of human rights violations	✓	✓	✓	—	✓	—
Preserve Hong Kong's autonomy	✓	✓	✓	—	⋯ <sub>6</sub>	—
Support Taiwan	✓	✓	✓	—	⋯ <sub>6</sub>	✗


1- Favors both multilateral/ bilateral diplomacy with China | 2- Supported by Macron, but party members are split | 3- Under Macron government, businesses will have to effectively phase out Huawei 5G by 2028 | 4- Manifesto cites need for international cooperation, while also condemning "Chinese imperialism" | 5- Previous calls for cooperation/ creation of European version | 6- Condemns "Chinese imperialism"

✓ Support    ⋯ Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## How do the French perceive China's influence in global affairs?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Age Groups

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Political Parties

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative



### Geography

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative







## PAST

Italy's geographic location has allowed it to develop influence and financial profit in both hemispheres. In 2013, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi expressed interest in the **Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)**, saying he found the project a "chance for [the economic development] of Italian ports."<sup>190</sup> Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni and several Italian leaders increased the frequency of their visits to and engagement with China. In 2017, Gentiloni was the only **G7** leader to attend the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, where he praised Premier Xi's decision to include Italian ports in the project.

Italy and China subsequently created new bilateral frameworks with the goal of deepening economic and political connections. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte signed a **Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on BRI**, to the chagrin of Italy's western allies.<sup>191</sup> Nor was the MoU unanimously supported domestically, with discontent from both the left and right. In fact, former Deputy PM Matteo Salvini tried to prevent Huawei from accessing Italian 5G networks.

## PRESENT

Mario Draghi, former **European Central Bank** president, succeeded Conte as prime minister in February 2021. Draghi's foreign policy has prioritized strengthening transatlantic ties and Italy's role in the EU, thus altering the direction of its China policy. Luigi Di Maio, the foreign minister, affirmed that Italy's relationship with the U.S. was far more important than its relationship with China. Di Maio described Italy's **NATO** and EU partnerships as "absolutely incomparable," saying that China is merely a commercial partner and does not compare with Italy's transatlantic "alliances of values."<sup>192</sup>

Prior to the 2021 G7 Conference, Italy announced it would reconsider its role in BRI, signaling that

its participation was destined to become functionally obsolete. Di Maio has criticized China on human rights issues and environmental commitments. On the sidelines of the G7, Draghi described China as "an autocracy that does not adhere to multilateral rules and does not share the same worldview as democracies."<sup>193</sup> He has proposed adopting a realistic approach predicated on cooperation as well as frank dialogue on unacceptable behavior.<sup>194</sup>

Since 2012, Italy has blocked foreign takeover attempts five times, preventing four Chinese bids in

the past two years alone. In November 2021, Draghi vetoed China's third attempted buyout of the year, with the Hong Kong arm of a U.S. company seeking to purchase the group's business in Italy and secure a joint venture.<sup>195</sup> Giancarlo Giorgetti, the Minister of Industry, argued the takeover could have had consequences in Italy's semiconductor sector. Still, Chinese ambassador Li Junhua confirmed that "China and Italy are global strategic partners. We seek beneficial results from cooperation, show deep appreciation for respective cultures, and help each other in times of trouble."<sup>196</sup>

## FUTURE

Italy's current governing coalition is a stable one. With Draghi at the helm, its policy objectives are to bolster the country's economy in the aftermath of the pandemic, and to strengthen ties to its closest western allies. Given its privileged relationship with China, Italy will likely be positioned to act as an intermediary between that country and the West. The challenge will be to find a balance between EU pressure to limit Chinese influence and Italy's own financial ties to Chinese industry. Draghi recently announced "Italy's advanced technology, combined with China's mega-sized market, will provide lasting impetus for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries."<sup>197</sup> That same week, during the **G20** Summit, Draghi raised issues about "stability and security in the Indo-Pacific area," referring to Taiwan, and pressured Premier Xi to renew the **EU-China Human Rights Dialogue**.

Italy has historically viewed itself as a bridge between east and west and has pursued open dialogue and economic partnerships with the U.S. and China.<sup>198</sup> It will probably walk a fine line between exerting political pressure on China and

engaging financially to strengthen its economy. Draghi's recent comments referring to China as an autocracy were intended not only for Italy's allies, but also as a message to the parties in his government to support his Atlanticist vision for Italy's future.<sup>199</sup>





CHINA

## Where do Italy's political parties stand?

					
Further develop EU-China strategy	✓	✓	—	—	⋯ <sub>1</sub>
Ratify the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)	✓	—	—	—	—
Promote fair economic relations	✓	✓	✓	✓	—
Protect networks, data, and high-tech from China	⋯ <sub>2</sub>	—	✓	—	—
Promote transatlantic cooperation vis-à-vis China	✓	✓	✓	—	—
Cooperate with China on climate change	✓	✓	—	—	—
Support Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)	⋯ <sub>3</sub>	⋯ <sub>4</sub>	✗ <sub>5</sub>	—	—
Condemnation of human rights violations	✓	—	—	—	—
Preserve Hong Kong's autonomy	—	—	—	—	—
Support Taiwan	—	—	—	—	—


1- Party opposes current construction of EU, but supports European approach toward China | 2- Former PM Giuseppe Conte approved of Huawei 5G technologies in Italy, but party support for China is waning | 3- Former M5S PM Giuseppe Conte approved, but now party questions it. BRI passed under M5S/Lega government | 4- Former PD PM Paolo Gentiloni approved | 5- First supported BRI, despite security concerns. Now opposes it outright.

✓ Support    ⋯ Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## How do Italians perceive China's influence in global affairs?

### Overall Perceptions




### Education

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Strongly Support + Somewhat Support




### Geography

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative



### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important







## PAST

Over the past decade, the UK has expanded its traditional view of China as an important trade partner to include human rights and security concerns. The UK government adopted one of the toughest stances of any European state toward China, denouncing Beijing for imposing the **National Security Law** on Hong Kong in 2020. This position has had a predictably damaging effect on UK-China relations.

During negotiations that led up to the 1997 handover, China committed to non-interference in the former British colony for 50 years.<sup>200</sup> The National Security Law directly violates the agreement. Hong Kongers born in the former British colony before 1997 make up the largest share of BNOs, or British Nationals (Overseas), but the Chinese government announced in early 2021 that it would no longer recognize BNO passports for travel or identification purposes.<sup>201</sup> The breakdown has filtered into other policy domains, including human rights, security, and technology challenges. In 2020, the UK government banned domestic mobile service providers from purchasing Huawei 5G equipment, citing national security concerns; this followed the U.S. decision to impose a series of sanctions on Huawei due to the same fears.<sup>202</sup>

## PRESENT

In its March 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, the UK describes China as a “systemic competitor” and announced a tilt to the wider Indo-Pacific region. Like many transatlantic actors, the UK wants to strengthen its ties in the region and tap into its economic growth. In 2021, the government appointed a new director general for the Indo-Pacific region and an ambassador to the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**, with which it became a “dialogue partner” in August.<sup>203</sup> It applied in Feb-

ruary to join the **Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)**, the successor of the failed **Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)**.

In May 2021, the UK sent one of its two aircraft carriers on an eight-month deployment in the Indo-Pacific. In September, it joined the U.S. and Australia as part of the Western Defense Pact, or **AUKUS**, with the UK likely to train the Australian Navy in using new American-made vessels. The move solidified the UK’s longstanding efforts to expand its engagement in the Indo-Pacific.<sup>204</sup> It also marked a low point in the already shaky Franco-British relationship, although UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and French President Emmanuel Macron have since held talks.<sup>205</sup>

## FUTURE

The UK’s position within the AUKUS partnership will further strengthen its position and voice in the Indo-Pacific region in the new year. In 2022, the UK will likely join the CPTPP as the bloc’s sole transatlantic actor.<sup>207</sup> China is also attempting to join the partnership, although its economic practices in the region could prove an obstacle to gaining acceptance.<sup>208</sup>

In April 2021, the UK parliament voted to declare that China was committing genocide against the Uyghur community in Xinjiang, while the Johnson government has officially labeled these actions as “industrial-scale” human rights abuses.<sup>206</sup> In 2021, China imposed retaliatory sanctions on 10 UK parliamentarians who led the vote on genocide, banning them from traveling to China and freezing any bank accounts they might have in the country. Unlike many states that have used strong rhetoric against China while failing to back it up with action, the UK has introduced economic penalties for businesses with connections in Xinjiang. It has also joined the U.S., Canada, and the EU in sanctioning Chinese companies and individuals. PM Boris Johnson has also said his government opposes the **Belt and Road Initiative**, vowing to help developing countries become less dependent on Chinese investment.

Under its **Global Britain** strategy, the UK seeks to pursue a “force for good” agenda. In 2022, it will likely continue to take a leading role in confronting China for its human rights abuses and territorial expansion in the South China Sea, and for violating the norms of international governance.<sup>209</sup> Like the Biden Administration, the Johnson government has underlined in its Integrated Review a desire to strengthen liberal democracy in the region with like-minded countries wary of Chinese expansionism and economic coercion.<sup>210</sup>





CHINA

## Where do the UK's political parties stand?

				
Promote fair economic relations	✓	—	—	—
Protect networks, data, and high-tech from China	✓	—	—	—
Promote transatlantic cooperation vis-à-vis China	✓	—	—	—
Cooperate with China on climate change	✓	✓	—	✓
Support Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)	⋯	—	—	—
Condemnation of human rights violations	✓	✓	✓	✓
Preserve Hong Kong's autonomy	✓	✓	✓	—
Support Taiwan	✓	✓	—	—

1- Calls for a western counter to BRI

✓ Support

⋯ Mixed Views

✗ Oppose

— No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## How do Britons perceive China's influence in global affairs?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Age Groups

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative




### Political Parties

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative



### Geography

Negative Perceptions: Generally Negative + Very Negative







# Technology



## PAST

Technological development in the U.S. and the rest of the world has been growing exponentially in recent years. In the last 10 years alone, the U.S. has upgraded from 3G and 4G to 5G networks, experienced the boom of social media platforms, the launch of cryptocurrencies, the growth of AI and Big Data, and the shift from local to cloud-based storage. U.S. technology regulation, however, has not been advancing at the same rate and has struggled to adapt as emerging technologies and internet platforms raise new challenges for the country's democracy and society. Data privacy, anticompetitive practices by Big Tech companies, targeted advertising, and content moderation were some of the biggest challenges of the 2010s.

Facebook (Meta) alone faced multiple PR crises over revelations that Russia used fake accounts to buy ads and interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In 2018, the **United Nations (UN)** accused Facebook of playing a critical role in the genocide of Myanmar's Rohingya Muslims by allowing hate speech to spread on the social media platform. The following year the company was fined \$5 billion by the **Federal Trade Commission (FTC)** for their role in the Cambridge Analytica data breach.<sup>211</sup> And in 2021, they faced backlash in the U.S., EU, UK, and France for hiding the fact that their platforms, particularly Instagram, had a negative impact on children's mental health.<sup>212</sup>

## PRESENT

U.S. policymakers have been aware of the challenges raised by anti-competitiveness in the technology sector and the power and influence internet companies wield over U.S. consumers. But now they are becoming aware of the gravity of these issues and the fact that their reactive approach of the past decade—fining companies and holding hearings—has not succeeded in effecting change.

## Transatlantic Primer

The government has recently been quicker to react to tech scandals and slightly more proactive. For instance, Congress held a series of Protecting Kids Online hearings to investigate the impact of Instagram<sup>213</sup>, Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube<sup>214</sup> on children and teens, following the revelations leaked by Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen. It is too early to tell whether these hearings will result in long-term changes to U.S. tech policy, but two proposals have already been introduced. Senator Ed Markey (D) pushed for changes to the Children and Teens' Online Privacy Protection Act that would ban tech companies from collecting data of users ages 13-15 without explicit consent. Senators Markey and Richard Blumenthal (D) also reintroduced the Kids Internet Design and Safety Act, which protects online users under 16 from certain engagement features and influencer marketing.<sup>215</sup>

## FUTURE

Given Congress' changing attitudes towards Big Tech companies and the Biden administration's new whole-of-government approach, the U.S. will likely take more concrete action against Big Tech companies to hold them accountable for both their antitrust practices and downplaying the role their companies play in undermining U.S. society and democracy.

At the same time, the administration has shown a strong commitment to innovation and leveraging technology to address the world's biggest challenges such as climate change. Future tech regulation will likely ensure new technologies are ethical, trustworthy, and respect democratic values, without interfering with private sector innovation. U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg made this point very clear at the Consumer Electronics Show (CES) on January 6 when he said that the public sector plays a key role in steering innovation towards the public good, but that the federal government also needs to know when to

The Biden administration signed an executive order<sup>216</sup> last summer that launched a whole-of-government antitrust initiative targeting companies like Amazon, Google, Apple, and Facebook, and created the **White House Competition Council** to oversee the initiative. On the data privacy front, **California's Consumer Privacy Act** paved the way for several more states to draft comprehensive privacy laws in 2021, including Virginia and Colorado.<sup>217</sup> Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives have also proposed a federal data privacy framework that provides all 50 states privacy guidelines to follow rather than a patchwork of different legislation, taking a similar path to the EU when they united all member states under the **General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)**.

get out of the way.<sup>218</sup> Increased collaboration between the U.S. and EU can also be expected on rolling out ethical AI, climate technology, as well as more communication on the development of technology standards, as these are important items on the agenda for **EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council** meetings in 2022.

Additionally, as House Democrats and Republicans have both released draft privacy bills and several U.S. states are in the process of passing their own, there will likely be more debates in Congress about implementing a federal privacy framework for data protection in the U.S., one that likely draws from the information disclosed in recent congressional hearings and the EU's implementation of the GDPR. These government initiatives and Congressional hearings will probably be slow in bringing change, but they are certainly a step closer to catching legislation up with the U.S.' fast-growing technology sector.







TECHNOLOGY

## Where do the U.S.' political parties stand?

		
Support Transatlantic Tech and Trade Council		
Support closer technology cooperation		
Support taxing big tech companies		
Increase regulation on technology companies		
Support data privacy legislation		
Increase investments in digitalization		
Increase investments in technology start-ups		
Invest in broadband		
Support Chinese 5G technologies		

 Support    Mixed Views    Oppose    No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Americans believe their country is keeping pace with technological advancements?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




### Education Levels

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes



### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes





## PAST

Germany has lagged notably in technological innovation in the digital age. In a 2017 study conducted by the **Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)**, it ranked 29 out of 34 industrialized nations for internet connections.<sup>219</sup> Another 2018 OECD study showed that more than half the jobs in Germany were “at risk of being automated or radically changed by new technologies.”<sup>220</sup> Chancellor Angela Merkel’s fourth government (2017-2021) placed a priority on overcoming Germany’s digital inadequacies, saying the country’s “future prosperity depends on it.”<sup>221</sup> In 2018, her government set up the Digital Council, a group composed of expert volunteers, to advise the chancellery on digital affairs.<sup>222</sup> But subsequent studies have shown that Germany remains behind.

Members of the Digital Council have cited a certain cultural skepticism regarding digital technologies as a factor that undermines Germany’s progress. Digital privacy concerns reign supreme, stemming mainly from the country’s history with government surveillance.<sup>223</sup> West Germany was one of the first countries in the world to introduce data protection laws.<sup>224</sup> Germany has continued to lead the way in Europe in digital privacy matters, with Chancellor Merkel being one of Europe’s strongest proponents of the European **General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)**, later implemented by the EU in 2018.<sup>225</sup>

## PRESENT

Most studies show that Germany is still lagging in technology. After three years on the job, Katrin Suder, head of the Digital Council, said shortly before the German election in September 2021: “We’re losing ground. We’re in the middle [of the] field somewhere, and we’re declining.”<sup>226</sup> Germany’s digital and technological shortcomings have been

particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, with its outdated bureaucracy complicating case reporting and vaccine rollouts. The same problems have trickled into other areas impacted by the multiple lockdowns, including working from home, virtual doctor visits, home schooling, and access to other basic public services.<sup>227</sup> In 2021, Germany ranked close to the bottom in the **EU’s Digital Economy and Society Index** for online citizen services.<sup>228</sup> Its private sector has also been reeling from other pandemic-related setbacks, most notably the global semiconductor shortage.<sup>229</sup> The domestic auto industry halted its production due to the scarcity of chips and other electric components, resulting in losses throughout the year.<sup>230</sup>

The new Scholz government, consisting of the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and Free Democrats (FDP), has made digitalization one of its priorities for the next four years. The “Modern State, Digital Awakening, and Innovations” section of the December 2021 coalition agreement states that Germany must be technologically capable, “espe-

cially in times of crisis,” a clear nod to the shortcomings experienced throughout the pandemic.<sup>231</sup> The agreement also aims to promote digital technologies and improve conditions for technology start-ups that promote innovation. It wants to ease the process by which companies can access public funds earmarked for technological innovation.<sup>232</sup> According to the agreement: “We can only secure our prosperity in the face of globalization if we continue to play in the top league in economic and technological terms and unleash the innovative forces of our economy.”<sup>233</sup>

Germany’s efforts in building out technologies has a green-focused component, stemming primarily from the Green Party’s inclusion in the coalition. The new government’s plan to phase out traditional combustion engines includes the goal of building 15 million electric cars and one million charging points by 2030.<sup>234</sup> It also supports the introduction of an EU strategy for green hydrogen with the goal of becoming a leading national market for such technologies by 2030.<sup>235</sup>

## FUTURE

Konstantin von Notz, a high-ranking Green Party politician, said shortly before the September 2021 election that Germany “has a lot of homework to do over the next four years” when it comes to technological innovation.<sup>236</sup> The Scholz government has placed a priority on improving Germany’s digital technologies, with a focus on state bureaucratic services and private sector development. Under the Scholz government, the chancellery has delegated many digital responsibilities to other ministries, a welcome development for technology experts who feel Chancellor Merkel’s chancellery failed in this area. More digital competencies will

fall to the Ministry of the Interior and Homeland (BMIH), the newly rebranded Ministry for Digital Affairs and Transportation (BMDV), and Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection (BM-WK).<sup>237</sup> The Ministry for Digital Affairs, led by the Free Democrats (FDP), will be at the forefront of Germany’s digital policy in the coming years.<sup>238</sup>





TECHNOLOGY

## Where do Germany's political parties stand?

	SPD	CDU CSU	BÜNDNIS 90 DIE GRÜNEN	Freie Demokraten FDP	Alternative für Deutschland	DIE LINKE.
Support closer technology cooperation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support taxing big tech companies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Increase regulation on technology companies	✓	✓	✓	—	—	✓
Support data privacy matters/GDPR	✓	✓	✓	⋯ <sub>1</sub>	✓	✓
Increase investments in digitalization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Increase investments in technology start-ups	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Investment in broadband	✓	✓	✓	✓	—	✓
Support Chinese 5G technologies	✗	—	✗	✗	—	—

1- Want updated regulations

✓ Support    ⋯ Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

### Transatlantic Primer


## Do Germans believe their country is keeping pace with technological advancements?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




### Education Levels

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes



### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes





## PAST

France's economic growth strategy has since the early 2010s focused heavily on innovation, research and development, and supporting young companies. In 2013, then-president François Hollande launched the New Industrial France program, which advanced the digital economy, smart devices, digital trust, smart food production, future mobility, and medicine. The main goal of this initiative was to modernize French industry and support small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), while at the same time recognizing that France has a comparative advantage in digital technology, largely thanks to its start-up ecosystem.<sup>239</sup>

By 2017, the Macron government set the goal of making France a start-up nation, creating an innovation fund with an endowment of 10 billion euros to foster digital transformation and ecological transition, enhance training, and promote business competitiveness.<sup>240</sup> In 2018, Macron's government decided to revamp **La French Tech**, a 2013 initiative aimed at boosting the country's start-up ecosystem and expanding its international reach, by placing more focus on supporting fast-growing start-ups with the greatest potential to become global tech leaders.<sup>241</sup>

## PRESENT

Macron has consistently amplified the success of his approach to tech policy and the progress his government has made in growing the French tech sector. Innovation fundraising has doubled since 2017, hitting €5.4 billion in 2020; France has gone from three "unicorns"—start-ups valued at more than \$1 billion—in 2017, to 15 in 2021.<sup>242, 243</sup> In addition to making France the number one country in Europe for tech innovation fundraising, Macron says part of a successful strategy is to deploy the policies being adopted at the European level,<sup>244</sup> particularly the EU's goal of achieving digital sovereignty. In 2020, he said that Europe should take steps to reduce its depen-

## Transatlantic Primer

dence on the U.S. technology giants and create European solutions to current challenges. He argued Europe needs more EU integration on start-up financing, a digital single market to promote privacy and tech innovation, and European cloud and data solutions. France and Germany, along with the European Commission, are currently working on an initiative called Gaia-X, a new framework for data infrastructure that aims to reduce Europe's reliance on U.S. and Chinese companies.<sup>245</sup>

Addressing the rising power of Big Tech in Europe has been another item at the top of France's agenda. In 2020, the French government notified Big Tech companies that they had to pay a three percent digital services tax, causing friction with the U.S. government, and has levied multiple fines on the largest U.S. firms. In 2021, Google was fined more than \$500 million for antitrust violations,<sup>246</sup> and in the first week of 2022, France's data privacy regulator fined Google and Facebook a combined

€210 million for making it difficult for users to refuse cookies.<sup>247</sup> France also recently amended a "republican principles" bill to include content moderation obligations for large online platforms, which will be in place until 2023 when the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) goes into law.<sup>248</sup> The DSA will similarly require companies to disclose details to regulators about their algorithms and content moderation practices.

One of the challenges with France's tech policy is that they want to rein in the power of American Big Tech as they invest heavily in the domestic tech sector to create the next French versions of Google, Apple, and Amazon. According to French tech policy experts at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation,<sup>249</sup> these policies contradict each other: heavily regulating American tech companies ultimately hurts only French consumers and tech start-ups that rely on U.S. platforms, like Apple's App Store and Google Play.

## FUTURE

President Macron's tech agenda in 2022 is largely consistent with his current tech policies; he wants to keep promoting fast growth while expanding the French and European tech sectors to help create local champions. In the summer of 2021, Macron announced that he wanted to create 10 technology companies in Europe worth €100 billion by 2030 to compete with the U.S. and Chinese tech companies leading the global market, and called for the creation of a European tech visa to attract foreign talent and investment for start-ups. This past fall, Macron unveiled the France 2030 plan, an investment plan of €30 billion that aims to develop innovative technology and industrial activity.<sup>250</sup> The investment includes €8 billion to develop energy technology to help reduce gas emissions and finance the building of a small nuclear reactor, and €4 billion to deploy two million electric and hybrid

vehicles. The plan also includes funding for the building of France's first low-carbon plane and for the development of innovative technology for food production, the film industry, and medicine.

Macron recognizes that while being a global leader in tech regulation is important, Europe also needs tech champions that allows them to lead the industry, gain independence from the U.S. and China, and compete on a global scale. While there is little overlap between the platforms of Macron and presidential candidate Marine Le Pen, their views might converge on tech policy, given that Le Pen's platform advocates a "France first" agenda and the creation of more tech jobs in France. She would, however, probably disagree with Macron's European tech visa proposal to bring foreign talent to France, since part of her platform calls for drastic limits on immigration.





## TECHNOLOGY

# Where do France's political parties stand?

	LA REPUBLIQUE En Marche !	les IR Républicains	Rassemblement National	R! RECONQUÊTE	PS SOCIAL ÉCOLOGIQUE	La France insoumise
Support closer technology cooperation	✓	✓	—	—	✓	—
Support taxing big tech companies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Increase regulation on technology companies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support GDPR	✓	✓	—	—	✓	—
Increase investments in digitalization	✓	✓	✓	—	✓	✓
Increase investments in technology start-ups	✓	✓	✓	—	—	✓
Investment in broadband	✓	✓	✓	—	—	—
Support Chinese 5G technologies	⚠ <sub>1</sub>	—	—	—	—	—


1- Under Macron government, businesses will have to effectively phase out Huawei 5G by 2028

✓ Support    ⚠ Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

## Transatlantic Primer


# Do the French believe their country is keeping pace with technological advancements?

## Overall Perceptions




## Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




## Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




## Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes



## Geography

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes







## PAST

Following the 2008 Eurozone crisis, Italy's industry and technology sector declined significantly. Between 2008 and 2015, the country saw a major decline in its medium-high and medium-low technology sectors, with total factor productivity decreasing by 6.2 percent between 2001 and 2019, compared to a general increase in the rest of Europe. In the foreword of Italy's **National Recovery and Resiliency Plan (PNRR)**, released in 2021, Prime Minister Mario Draghi mentioned that "among the causes of such a poor productivity performance is that Italy was not able to seize the many opportunities offered by the digital revolution."<sup>251</sup>

In 2016, Italy started to develop a digital agenda to address the lack of a comprehensive policy for the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector. The Ministry of Economic Development (MISE) invested in key enabling technologies to promote sustainable growth and introduced IT vouchers for SMEs in 2014 for the acquisition of IT materials. Italy also launched the **National Technology Clusters** program in 2012 to identify companies, universities, and other public or private research organizations active in the field of innovation focusing on eight technology fields, including aerospace, life sciences, and smart mobility.

## PRESENT

The slow economic recovery and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has continued to affect Italy's ability to innovate and grow at the same rate as other major European countries. The EU's 2021 **Digital Economy and Society (DESI)** Index revealed that Italy suffers from a digital infrastructure and human capital gap compared to other EU member states. Italy is among the three EU countries with the lowest digital skills and ICT training, has the lowest percentage of ICT graduates, and

ranks fifth lowest in terms of fixed broadband take-up and coverage, mobile broadband, and broadband prices. The country's industry has also been slow in the adoption of new technologies, particularly big data and AI.<sup>252</sup>

Over the last few years, the government has adopted some measures to be more proactive in the tech space and provide more funding for innovation, technology R&D, and technology transfer.<sup>253</sup> In 2019, it established the **National Innovation Fund** with an initial budget of €1 billion and in 2021 MISE launched ENEA Tech, a foundation that manages a €500 million fund for investments in innovative technologies that are of strategic national interest to Italy. ENEA Tech's mission is to expand Italian industry, strengthen its supply chains, promote growth, and provide better opportunities for Italian youth through technology transfer.<sup>254</sup>

## FUTURE

Italy's future goals for technology continue to focus on R&D and technology transfer. The fourth mission on their PNRR is "to achieve a knowledge-based economy by strengthening the education and research ecosystem, digital and STEM skills, and technology transfer."<sup>258</sup> To this end, Italy is committing a total of €30.88 billion, including €1.6 billion to strengthening research structures and national R&D champions on key enabling technologies, such as big data, quantum computing, biopharma, and fintech; €1.8 billion to fund a National Research Program that will run from 2021-27 to finance 5,350 research projects in various sectors; and €1 billion to strengthen the National Innovation Fund and support 250 innovative start-ups.<sup>259</sup>

The PNRR surprisingly does not focus much on AI or list it as a key enabling technology, but the government did publish a draft AI strategy in 2020 that

The European Center for Digital Competitiveness' Digital Riser 2021 report, which measures digital competitiveness by looking at a country's ecosystem and its mindset, showed that Italy was able to improve its position in the G7 from last place in 2020 to second behind France in 2021.<sup>255</sup> This significant improvement is largely thanks to EU funds allotted to aid European recovery during the pandemic.<sup>256</sup> The Digital Europe Program specifically made €7.5 billion available to EU countries to develop key tech areas, including supercomputing, AI, cybersecurity, advanced digital skills, and creating digital innovation hubs that will help companies respond to digital challenges. Italy currently has 53 fully operational digital hubs and 14 in preparation, including university research centers.<sup>257</sup>

provides a long-term vision for the sustainable development of AI. Italy's AI strategy estimates a public investment of €2.5 billion and follows the EU's human-centered AI approach of investing in AI education, reskilling opportunities, and fostering AI research. In November 2021, Italy also launched a Strategic Program on AI, which will run from 2022-24. This program will implement 24 policy initiatives that will be fundamental for Italy's technological competitiveness at the international level; it will address key challenges Italian citizens face and focus on three areas of intervention. These areas include strengthening and attracting the talents and competences that will enable an AI-driven economy, expanding funding of advanced research in AI, and favoring the adoption of AI and its applications both in the public administration and in the Italian economy at large.<sup>260</sup>





## TECHNOLOGY

# Where do Italy's political parties stand?

					
Support closer technology cooperation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support taxing big tech companies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Increase regulation on technology companies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support GDPR	—	✓	⋯ <sup>1</sup>	—	—
Increase investments in digitalization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Increase investments in technology start-ups	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Investment in broadband	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Support Chinese 5G technologies	⋯ <sup>2</sup>	✗	✗	⋯ <sup>3</sup>	⋯ <sup>3</sup>


1- No clear position on GDPR, but calls for other data privacy measures. | 2- Former PM Giuseppe Conte approved of Huawei 5G technologies in Italy | 3- Party calls for security in technology supply

✓ Support    ⋯ Mixed Views    ✗ Oppose    — No Official Position

## Transatlantic Primer

# Do Italians believe their country is keeping pace with technological advancements?

## Overall Perceptions




## Education

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




## Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




## Geography

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes



## Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes







## PAST

During the 2010s, the UK promoted economic growth via technology-enabled transformations in manufacturing, infrastructure, and the internet. The country wanted to shift away from an overdependence on services and towards the production of goods. The best way to achieve this goal was to lean on new technologies and trends, such as rapid prototyping, 3D printing, investing in smart infrastructure, taking a more strategic approach to intellectual property (IP), and IP-based business models.<sup>261</sup> The UK also paid close attention to the “second internet revolution” and sought greater government involvement to enable more infrastructure investment, provide internet as a right, and regulate online content.<sup>262</sup>

The government also prioritized digitization of the public sector. A Government Digital Services (GDS) unit created within the cabinet office in 2011 adopted a “government as a start-up” culture, embodying the agility and best practices of Silicon Valley. One of their main goals was to create government internet services that were as good or better than those provided by the private sector.<sup>263</sup>

## PRESENT

Post-Brexit, there was a lot of uncertainty about how leaving the EU would affect the UK’s technology sector, the transfer of personal data, and digital trade. Since the **UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)** took effect in January of 2021, the transfer of personal data between the UK and EU is no longer allowed by default. But in June 2021, the EU Commission adopted two adequacy decisions for the UK, which allow the free flow of personal data to continue as it did when the UK was still an EU member, though there is a sunset clause in the decision, meaning the adequacy is valid only for the next four years.<sup>264</sup>

The EU does not usually agree to the full exchange of products and services via digital channels but allowed it in the TCA. The agreement also contains language about the UK and EU cooperating on the development of emerging technologies, such as AI and quantum computing. This cooperation will be in the form of dialogue between regulators, public, and private institutions as new technologies are developed, support of research and product development efforts, and rolling out compatible market rules that allow for

technologies developed in the UK or EU to more easily be sold in each other’s markets.<sup>265</sup> Lastly, the TCA creates obligations on **net neutrality** and commitments to an open internet, but it does not prevent either the UK or EU from taking action to protect the safety of internet users.<sup>266</sup> This caveat is key for issues like online privacy given that UK Digital Secretary Oliver Dowden called the EU’s data protection regime slightly protectionist and hinted that the UK would go their own way on certain issues.<sup>267</sup>

## FUTURE

Since the **Brexit** vote, the UK has taken initiative on various digital issues to continue taking advantage of what the technology space has to offer. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) is in the process of developing a national data strategy and policy framework to “unlock the value of data from the private and third sector” and address the high costs associated with data sharing and low public trust in how data is being used.<sup>268</sup> On the start-up front, the UK is also making some progress. At the end of 2021, research found that London is the leading destination for tech start-ups in Europe; the city’s tech sector is expected to continue growing and become a leader on the global stage.<sup>269</sup> UK impact start-ups also raised £2 billion to tackle global challenges like climate change, health and safety, and raised investment by 127 percent compared to 2018.

Regarding the UK’s future tech strategy, DCMS recently outlined their top 10 tech priorities to shape a new golden age for technology in the UK and to fuel economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>270</sup> These priorities include rolling out world-class digital infrastructure nationwide, becoming the world’s number one data desti-

nation for international companies, becoming a tech-savvy nation, drafting online harms legislation to hold social media companies accountable and ensure user safety, fueling a new era of start-ups and scale ups, unleashing the power of technology and AI, championing free and fair digital trade, and using digital innovation to build British climate and conservation technology to reach net zero emissions by 2050.<sup>271</sup>





TECHNOLOGY

## Where do the UK's political parties stand?



Labour

Liberal Democrats

SNP

Support taxing big tech companies



Increase regulation on technology companies



Uphold Data Protection Act



Increase investments in digitalization



Increase investments in technology start-ups



Invest in broadband



Support Chinese 5G technologies



Support



Mixed Views



Oppose




No Official Position

Transatlantic Primer


## Do Britons believe their country is keeping pace with technological advancements?

### Overall Perceptions




### Socioeconomic Status

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




### Age Groups

Positive Perceptions: Yes + Somewhat Yes




### Geography

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important



### Political Parties

Positive Perceptions: Very Important + Somewhat Important





# NOTES







## United States

**Democratic Party:** The Democratic Party is one of the U.S.' two main political parties. Its platform promotes modern liberalism, civil liberties, and social equality with support for a mixed economy. In the U.S. Congress, the party is a big-tent coalition with centrist, progressive, and conservative wings. Currently, the party holds the White House and both chambers of Congress.



**Republican Party:** The Republican Party, also known as the Grand Old Party (GOP), is the second of the U.S.' two major political parties. Its platform mainly focuses on reducing the size of government, decreasing taxes and regulation, and promoting conservative social values.

## Germany



**Social Democratic Party (SPD):** On the center-left of Germany's political spectrum are the Social Democrats (SPD), the country's oldest political party. The party is pro-European and has traditionally promoted workers' rights. After its electoral victory in the 2021 federal election, it leads the current German government under the leadership of Chancellor Olaf Scholz.



**Christian Democratic Union (CDU):** The Christian Democratic Union is one of Germany's two big-tent parties, representing the center-right of Germany's modern political spectrum. The liberal-conservative party ruled Germany from 2005 to 2021 under the leadership of former Chancellor Angela Merkel.



**The Green Party:** The Green Party, or simply, the Greens, evolved out of environmentalist, anti-nuclear, and anti-war protest movements in the 1970s. The protest-movement-turned-political party still focuses primarily on combating climate change but has also expanded its platform to become a mainstream center-left party. It is currently a junior coalition partner of the ruling German government (with the SPD and FDP).



**Free Democratic Party (FDP):** The FDP is a laissez-faire party that promotes free markets and privatization. The FDP tends to be center-right, aligning with the CDU on economic issues, but also center-left, aligning with the SPD and the Greens on civil liberties issues. Currently, the party is a junior coalition partner of the ruling national government (with the SPD and Greens).



**Alternative for Germany (AfD):** The AfD is a right-wing populist political party founded in 2013 on a Eurosceptic platform. The party support increased in the wake of the European migrant crisis in 2015. Its highly controversial far-right, anti-immigration platform has made it a political pariah, traditionally shunned by Germany's other parties. Accordingly, the AfD has never featured in a governing coalition.



**The Left Party (Die Linke):** Die Linke, or Left Party, is a far-left party with origins in East Germany's former Communist Party. It enjoys especially strong support in former East Germany. While it has never served in a national coalition, Die Linke has featured in state-level governments.

## France



**La République En Marche!:** En Marche! is a relatively new political party, founded by current French President Emmanuel Macron in 2017. The party's centrist platform appeals to both the center-left and center-right. The party is starkly pro-European while also promoting social and economic liberalism.



**Les Républicains:** The French Republicans is a liberal-conservative party, representing the center-right of France's political spectrum. It is France's main conservative party, representing French "Gaullism", characterized by social conservatism, patriarchy, and French nationalism.



**National Rally (RN):** National Rally, formerly known as National Front, is a far-right political party. Currently led by Marine Le Pen, the party opposes immigration, promotes conservative values, and is against Europeanization.



**Reconquête:** Reconquête is a far-right, populist party formed by leader Eric Zemmour in December 2021 ahead of the 2022 French presidential election. The party promotes French nationalism, strict immigration policies, and a removal of France from NATO's integrated command.



**Socialist Party:** The Socialist Party is a moderate center left party. The party espouses social democratic values, the French ecological transition, and France's place within the European Union.



**La France Insoumise:** La France Insoumise is a far-left party headed by leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The party promotes eco-socialism, calls for reform within the European Union, and opposes NATO and other core areas of transatlantic cooperation.

## Italy



**Five Star Movement (M5S):** The Five Star Movement is a populist, centrist party, currently holding power in the Italian government with the Democratic Party, Lega, and Forza Italia. Its early success focused on anti-corruption politics and direct democracy.



**Democratic Party (DP):** The Italian Democratic Party, founded in 2007, is Italy's main social democratic party representing the center left. The party has made efforts to appeal to both sides of the political spectrum, and has also served in government with right-leaning parties. It is a part of the current Italian government, along with the Five Star Movement, Lega, and Forza Italia.





**Lega per Salvini Premier (LSP):** Lega, formerly known as Lega Nord, is a far-right, populist party. It has promoted regionalism and anti-immigration policies. It currently shares power in the Italian government with the Democratic Party, Forza Italia, and Five Star Movement.



**Forza Italia (FI):** Forza Italia is a center-right, Christian Democratic party, promoting liberal conservatism. It currently shares power in the Italian government with the Democratic Party, Lega, and Five Star Movement.



**Brothers of Italy (Fdi):** The Brothers of Italy is a far-right political party that promotes Italian nationalism and social conservatism. The party opposes immigration and questions Italy's place within the European Union.

United Kingdom



**Conservative Party:** The Conservative Party is one the UK's two main political parties, representing the center-right. The "Tories" promote economic liberalism and unionism (the continued unity of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland). They also advocated for Brexit. Since 2019, the party has had an overall majority in the House of Commons with Prime Minister Boris Johnson at the helm of government.



**Labour Party:** The Labour Party is second of the two major parties in the UK, representing the center left of modern-day UK politics. It consists of an alliance of social democrats, democratic socialists, and trade unionists. The party has struggled in recent years, last holding power in the House of Commons in 2010.



**Liberal Democrats:** The Liberal Democrats, or LibDems, are a smaller, center-left party. The party promotes social liberalism and the UK's former membership of the European Union.



**Scottish National Party (SNP):** The SNP is a Scottish social democratic party. It supports Scottish independence and joining the European Union (following the UK's Brexit). The party currently governs Scotland with a power-sharing agreement with the smaller Scottish Green party.

GLOSSARY

**Article 5 (NATO):** the collective defense clause of NATO, meaning that an attack against one member state is considered as an attack against all member states.

**ARPA-E (Advanced Research Project Agency – Energy):** a U.S. government agency tasked with promoting and funding research and development of advanced energy technologies.

**ARPA-C (Advanced Research Project Agency – Climate):** a proposed U.S. government agency, housed under the Department of Energy, focused on research and development around climate innovation.

**Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN):** an economic union comprised of 10 member states in Southeast Asia, promoting intergovernmental cooperation and facilitating economic, political, security, military, educational, and sociocultural integration between its members and other countries in Asia.

**AUKUS:** a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

**Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):** a global infrastructure development strategy, formerly known as One Belt One Road, adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 to invest in nearly 70 countries and international organizations.

**Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill:** The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act is a 1.2 trillion act passed by the Senate in November 2021. \$550 billion of the act aims to rebuild America's infrastructure over the next five years.

**Brexit:** the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.

**Build Back Better Act:** a legislative proposal of the Biden White House focused on federal investments in education, child care, health care, and climate change following the COVID-19 pandemic.

**California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA):** a California law passed in 2020 that aims to improve data rights and consumer protection.

**Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM):** a carbon-pricing system for imports into the European Union. It adjusts the price of certain imported products to the amount of carbon emissions incorporated in them, equalizing the cost of carbon between EU products and imported goods.

**Carbon Leakage:** a situation in which a business transfers production or other related activities to a country or countries with laxer climate regulations, ultimately producing greater greenhouse gas emissions.

**Circular Economy:** a green economic model that promotes renewable energy sources, as well as recycling and repairing goods to be reused as much as possible.

**Climate Decree (Italy):** an Italian initiative aiming to improve air quality, reduce waste, and improve soil quality.

**Coalition of the Willing:** a multi-national force that supported the U.S. during the 2003 Invasion of Iraq.

**Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI):** a proposed trade agreement between the People's Republic of China and the European Union.



**Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP):** a trade agreement among Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. It evolved from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which never entered into force due to the withdrawal of the United States.

**Counter ISIS Finance Group:** one of four working groups of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS that aims to track and counter ISIS financing.

**Defense and National Security Strategic Review (France):** A 2017 strategic review conducted by the French Ministry of Defense establishing a framework to confront the country's most pressing national security challenges.

**Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR):** a free trade agreement between the United States and a group of Central American economies, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, as well as the Dominican Republic.

**Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS):** a market-based approach to controlling pollution by which a central authority places limits on emissions, gives polluting actors allowances in line with such limits, and then allows those actors to buy and sell the allowances.

**Energiewende:** Germany's ongoing transition to a low-carbon, environmentally sound, reliable, and affordable energy supply.

**Euro-African Summit:** an annual summit between African and European heads of state and government to determine joint priorities for their common future.

**European Commission:** The European Commission is the EU's politically independent executive arm. It is responsible for drawing up

proposals for EU legislation, and it implements the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.

**European Central Bank (ECB):** the central bank responsible for monetary policy of EU member countries that have adopted the euro.

**European Council Presidency:** a body responsible for the functioning of the Council of the European Union. The presidency rotates among EU member states every six months. The presidency is not held by an individual, but rather by the national government of the member state.

**European Defense Fund:** a European Commission initiative that supports collaborative defense research and development and promotes greater European military integration.

**EU-China Human Rights Dialogue:** an annual forum in which European Union and Chinese officials discuss a wide range of human rights issues in China and the EU.

**EU Digital Economy and Society (DESI) Index:** An annual measurement of the progress of EU member states towards a digital economy and society.

**EU Foreign Affairs Council:** a configuration of the Council of the European Union that convenes once a month, bringing together EU member state foreign ministers. Ministers responsible for European affairs, defense, development, and trade also participate depending on the items on agenda.

**European Innovation Council (EIC):** a body intended to promote innovation, funding, networking, and partnership among European researchers, start-ups, and SMEs.

**EU Recovery Fund (NextGenerationEU):** the European Union's largest stimulus package ever (€2 trillion). It is a temporary instrument designed to help rebuild Europe following the COVID-19 pandemic.

**European Union:** a bloc of 27 European countries with governing common economic, social, and security policies.

**Eurozone:** the economic region formed by member states of the European Union that have adopted the euro.

**Federation of German Industries (BDI):** the leading organization of German industry and industry-related service providers, representing 39 industry associations and more than 100,000 companies with around 8 million employees.

**General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR):** a regulation in EU law that promotes greater data protection and privacy in the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA).

**Gilets Jaunes (yellow vests protests):** a series of grassroots protests in France, focused on economic justice and institutional political reforms.

**Global Britain:** the UK government's agenda for its post-Brexit foreign policy.

**Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (D-ISIS):** an 83-member global coalition of countries dedicated to defeating the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

**Global Zero:** a global movement that aims to eradicate all nuclear weapons by 2030.

**Green Revolution and Ecological Transition (Italy):** Italy's green and ecological transition focuses on promoting a circular economy, with the development of renewable energy sources and more sustainable agriculture.

**G7:** a multinational forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Group of Seven, as it is also known, is comprised of the seven largest global economies.

**G20:** a multinational forum comprised of 19 countries and the European Union (EU). Founded in 1999, the group addresses several global challenges, including international finance, climate change, and sustainability.

**Hong Kong National Security Law:** a People's Republic of China law, passed in the wake of the 2019 Hong Kong protests, that criminalizes secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign organizations in Hong Kong. The law suppresses free speech and permits state surveillance, detainment, and searching of individuals and organizations suspected of breaking the rules set by the law.

**International Labor Organization:** A UN agency that establishes international labor and living standards.

**International Security Assistance Force (ISAF):** a multinational military mission that operated in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014.

**Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Daesh:** a radical Sunni Muslim organization whose aim is to restore an Islamic state, or caliphate, in the region encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and southeastern Turkey.

**Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding:** a 2017 agreement between Italy and Libya to strengthen their cooperation in the field of migration, specifically curbing migration and improving border control from North Africa through the Mediterranean Sea.

**Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA):** a 2015 agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), to reduce Iran's development of nuclear weapons.

**Kyoto Protocol:** adopted in 1997, the protocol commits industrialized countries and developing economies to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions by agreed-upon targets.



**La French Tech:** France's startup scene, bringing together startups, investors, policymakers and community builders.

**Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on BRI (Italy):** an agreement between Italy and China to strengthen mutual cooperation on economic matters.

**Mercosur:** a South American trading bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay.

**National Innovation Fund (Italy):** an Italian government-funded initiative that aims to support Italian start-ups and SMEs in the technology sector.

**National Strategy for the Circular Economy (Italy):** Italy's strategy to meet the climate commitments adopted under the Paris Agreement and other multi-national climate pacts.

**National Recovery and Resiliency Plan (PNRR) (Italy):** Italy's investment and reform plan for recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

**National Technology Clusters (Italy):** an Italian network of public and private entities that aims to boost Italian innovation and competition on the European and global stages.

**Net neutrality:** the idea that an internet service provider, or ISP, should treat all data that travels over its network fairly without favoring any particular app, service, or website.

**The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA):** enacted in 1994, the agreement created a free trade zone for Mexico, Canada, and the United States. The USMCA replaced NAFTA in 2020.

**NATO Integrated Military Command Structure:** the agreed basis for organizing, training and controlling NATO forces.

**New Green Deal for Italy:** Italy's long-term plan to build a decarbonized and green economy.

**Nord Stream 2 pipeline (NS2):** a natural gas pipeline, running under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):** founded in 1949, a military alliance of 30 countries from Europe and North America that exists to protect the people and territory of its members.

**Northern Ireland Protocol:** an arrangement, negotiated during Brexit talks, that regulates trade, customs, and immigration between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

**OECD:** a 38-member international organization that promotes developments to global trade and economic progress.

**Operation Barkhane:** an ongoing anti-insurgent operation led by the French military against Islamist groups in Africa's Sahel region.

**Operation Enhanced Forward Presence:** a NATO mission divided into four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland that aims to counter Russian aggression in eastern Europe.

**Operation Resolute Support:** a 2015 successor of ISAF, a NATO mission supporting Afghan security forces and institutions. The mission terminated in September 2021 following the U.S. and European withdrawal from Afghanistan.

**Ostpolitik:** a policy of normalizing relations and openness towards the "East" (Russia) from the "West."

**Paris Climate Accords:** a 2015 international treaty on climate change that aims to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions in order to limit rising global temperatures.

**Phase One Agreement:** the first phase of a trade agreement between the United States and China. The 2020 agreement expanded Chinese purchases of U.S. goods and services by a combined \$200 billion for a two-year period (2020-2022).

**PNIEC (Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan):** an Italian plan that sets national targets for 2030 on energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, and carbon emission reductions.

**pPTE (Proposal of the Plan for Ecological Transition):** an Italian proposal for promoting the country's ecological transition.

**Quad:** a four-country security dialogue comprised of Australia, India, Japan and the United States focused primarily on the Indo-Pacific region.

**Renaissance Group:** President Emmanuel Macron's pro-European party in the European Parliament.

**Strategic Autonomy (Europe):** the ability of the European Union to defend itself and pursue its interests without as much reliance on the United States.

**Strategic Compass:** a European strategy that aims to define political and strategic ambitions in the security and defense realm for 2025 to 2030. A first draft of the compass featured in November 2021 and will be finalized under the French EU Council Presidency in 2022.

**Strategic Update (France):** an update to France's 2017 Defense and National Security Strategic Review that establishes the foundation for the next Military Programming Act (2019-2025). The 2021 edition provided context to the updated strategic environment, most notably in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

**The Troubles:** a multi-decade period of sectarian violence between ethno-nationalist groups in Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement ended the conflict in 1998.

**Traffic Light Coalition:** a governing coalition consisted of the Social Democratic Party (red), the Green Party (green), and the Free Democratic Party (yellow).

**Transatlantic Climate Bridge:** a climate partnership between Germany and the United States, founded in 2008.

**Transatlantic Economic Council:** founded in 2007, a forum for economic dialogue between the United States and the European Union.

**Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP):** a once-proposed trade agreement between the European Union and the United States.

**Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council (TTC):** A forum between the United States and European Union on coordinating approaches to key global technology, economic, and trade issues.

**Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP):** a proposed trade agreement between 11 countries signed in 2016. After the agreement failed in 2017, following the U.S.' withdrawal, the remaining countries negotiated the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

**Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW):** the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons.

**UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA):** a free trade agreement signed on December 30 2020, between the United Kingdom and the European Union. It entered force on May 1, 2021.

**United Nations:** the largest intergovernmental organization, comprised of 193 members, aimed at promoting international norms and cooperation between nations on the most pressing global challenges.

**UN Security Council:** a 15-member body responsible for maintaining international peace and security.



**United Nations Climate Change Conference:** an annual conference, organized by the UN, that brings together both advanced and developing economies to tackle ongoing challenges and determine collective responses to the climate crisis.

**United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG):** a collection of 17 goals designed to promote sustainable development among globalized economies.

**U.S.-EU Summit:** an annual meeting between the European Union and the United States setting a joint agenda for EU-U.S. cooperation.

**U.S. Federal Trade Commission:** an independent agency of the United States government whose principal mission is the enforcement of civil (non-criminal) U.S. antitrust law and the promotion of consumer protection.

**U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA):** a free trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. It replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and entered into effect on July 1, 2020.

**United States Trade Representative:** an agency of the United States federal government responsible for developing and promoting U.S. trade policy.

**White House Competition Council (U.S.):** a body established by the Biden administration that focuses on ways in which the U.S. government can promote cross-sector competition in the American economy.

**World Health Organization (WHO):** a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for promoting international public health.

**World Trade Organization (WTO):** an international organization that determines the rules of trade between countries.

**1.5-Degree Celsius Path:** a call from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on how countries can reduce the impacts of climate change by limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees.

**232 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs:** a series of U.S. tariffs targeting steel and aluminum products from the European Union. The tariffs were rescinded by the Biden administration in November 2021.

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